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I.

INTRODUCTION

The nine most terrifying words in the English language are
I’m from the government and I’m here to help.
– Ronald Reagan1
Big banks are once again getting ahead of themselves and

1. See Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment, 446 Md. 254, 257
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (quoting Ronald Regan at a news conference on
August 12, 1986).
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diminishing the stringent standards that Congress implemented to
protect consumers in residential mortgage transactions. The recent
financial collapse of 2007-2009 illustrates the big banks’
consequences of ignoring risk while carelessly funding mortgage
borrowing.2 The mortgage loan crises of the 1980s and 2007-2009
revealed that inflated real estate appraisals played a key role in the
collapse of major banking institutions and the real estate housing
market.3
However, many still believe that the largest sector of the
mortgage market remains “safe” because two government-chartered
companies support it: the Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac”).4 The assumption is that the federal government
would bail out these two institutions if they were unable to meet
their debt obligation.5 Over the past few decades, social trends and
government policies exacerbated both the mortgage capital oversupply and the risk-valuation disconnect.6 In an attempt to deal
with consequences of careless mortgage lending, Congress passed
series of regulations to combat the issue of inflated real estate
appraisals.7 These regulations serve a dual role of keeping financial
conglomerates from employing deceptive lending tactics while
protecting consumers against mortgage fraud.
While the real estate market is slowly recovering from the
2007-2009 housing crash, privately owned companies, such as
Freddie Mac, are pushing for the use of automated collateral
evaluation products (“ACEs”) to bypass the use of a traditional
appraisal in residential mortgage transactions.8 This undermines
the integrity of the loan application process, which relies heavily on
the accuracy of real estate appraisals. 9 Ultimately, the real estate
industry is moving away from stringent appraisal regulations
implemented by Congress toward an era that relies on computergenerated data, which fails to recognize the unique nature of each
parcel of real estate. The appraisal industry is raising serious
concerns over ACEs by accusing big banks of not bearing the
2. Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the U.S. Real Estate
Market Collapse, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 926 (2010).
3. Kevin J. Murray, Issues in Appraisal Regulation: The Cracks in the
Foundation of the Mortgage Lending Process, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1301, 1302
(2010).
4. David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee Of Fannie Mae
And Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up The Tab, 24 GA. L.
REV. 1019, 1022 (2008).
5. Id. at 1022.
6. Boyack, supra note 2, at 922.
7. Murray, supra note 3, at 1307.
8. Freddie Mac Guide, Automated Collateral Evaluation, FREDDIE MAC,
www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/ace.pdf (July 2018).
9. See Murray, supra note 3, at 1307 (noting that when inflated appraisals
are used to support home mortgages, borrowers are saddled with debts that
exceed home values).
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consequences of risk.10 This is a dangerous step for the loan
origination process, which could lead to disastrous consequences,
such as those seen in the most recent financial crisis.11 In short, we
may be heading towards another housing crash.
This Article critiques the regulatory gaps in the appraisal
industry that facilitate production of inaccurate residential real
estate appraisals and the increasing use of automated collateral
evaluation products (“ACEs”). Part I briefly introduces the focus of
this article. Part II discusses different types of real estate appraisal
and provides background information on their role in mortgage
transactions. This section also examines how the recent 2007-2009
financial crisis resulted in the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Additionally, it considers the role of large financial institutions,
such as Freddie Mac, and the increasing use of ACEs in residential
mortgage transactions. Part III explores the two competing
appraisal approaches (i.e. ACEs and traditional appraisals) and
how they both affect real estate transactions. Part IV proposes
solutions to current regulatory gaps in the appraisal industry, and
advises as to what can be done to improve appraisal credibility.
Finally, Part V concludes that the use of ACEs in residential
mortgage transactions should be limited to non-mortgage
transactions.

II. BACKGROUND
In a typical residential mortgage transaction, an appraisal is
essential to determine the fair market value of real property.12
Appraisals are vital to mortgage lenders, who regularly use them in
the credit decision process.13 A borrower promises to make periodic

10. Kelsey Ramirez, Appraisers Raise Concerns Over Fannie, Freddie
Automated Appraisals, HOUSING WIRE, (Aug. 25, 2017) www.housingwire.com/
articles/41097-appraisers-raise-concerns-over-fannie-freddie-automatedappraisals.
11. Id.
12. Janet Wickell, Residential Real Estate Appraisals, BALANCE, (Nov. 13,
2018)
www.thebalance.com/facts-about-residential-real-estate-appraisals1797691.
13. Murray, supra note 3, at 1307. To ensure its recovery of the outstanding
mortgage balance, the lender typically lends only a percentage-typically 80
percent of the market value of the home. Id. The 80 % LTV (loan-to-value) is the
maximum that amount that can be extended while reasonably ensuring the
lender’s ability to recover the outstanding balance of the principal loan through
a foreclosure sale in case of borrower’s default. Id. at 1308. However, there are
many loan programs with a LTV ranging anywhere from 90% LTV to 96.5 LTV%
to even 100% LTV such as Veteran’s loan. Id.; see also FANNIE MAE, Know Your
Options
By
Fannie
Mae
www.knowyouroptions.com/buy/buyingprocess/qualify-for-a-mortgage (discussing different mortgage buying options);
see Michael L. Weissman, Real Estate Collateral – Commercial and Industrial
Loan Documentation, IICLE, at 8 (2014), www.iicle.com/iicleonline/detail/30025
(discussing lender’s reliance on real estate appraisals).
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payments on the loan and gives the lender a lien on the home as
collateral to secure the mortgage.14 The lender’s mortgage approval
decision is based on both the borrower’s financial status and the
value of the underlying real property. 15 The lender then hires an
appraiser to generate an appraisal report based on his opinion of
value of the underlying real property.16 In the event that the
borrower defaults, the lender relies upon the value of the home to
recover the outstanding balance of the loan through a foreclosure
sale.17
The background section is divided into five parts. Section “A”
discusses the role of an appraisal in residential mortgage
transactions. Section “B” explains three different types of
traditional real estate appraisals. Section “C” provides the historical
background of the last two financial crises: The Savings and Loan
Crisis of 1980s, and the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Section “D”
discusses current challenges in appraisal regulation. Section “E”
introduces the concept of automated collateral evaluation products
(ACEs) and their endorsement by big financial institutions, such as
Freddie Mac.

A. The Role of an Appraisal in Residential Mortgage
Transactions
The real estate lending process may be simplistically described
as a “triangle” composed of a borrower, a lender, and an appraiser.18
An appraisal of real property has been defined as a “written
statement that contains an estimate of value of an adequately
described real property as of a specified date, supported by the
presentation and analysis of relevant market data.”19 “The objective
of the appraisal is to determine the highest and best use of the
property, i.e., the reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land
or an improved property that is physically possible, appropriately
supported, and financially feasible, and that results in the highest
value.”20
An appraiser’s job is to issue a credible opinion of value based
on comprehensive research and market analysis. 21 Because lenders
use appraisal reports as one of the more important underwriting

14. Murray, supra note 3, at 1307.
15. Cherokee W. Wooley, Regulation of Real Estate Appraisers and
Appraisals: The Effects of FIRRERA, 43 EMORY L.J. 357, 358 (1994).
16. Id.
17. Murray, supra note 3, at 1307.
18. Wooley, supra note 15, at 358.
19. Id. at 368.
20. See Weissman, supra note 13 (noting that he highest and best use of real
property must meet legal permissibility, physical possibility, financial
feasibility, and maximum profitability).
21. Murray, supra note 3, at 1308.
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tools, regulatory agencies have set forth basic information
requirements that every appraisal must contain. 22 The report itself
provides very useful information pertaining to current market
conditions, characteristics of a particular neighborhood in which the
property is located, value of land and any improvements, and
current rental rates and operating expenses.23
In a residential mortgage transaction, appraisals are typically
required any time a federally regulated institution makes a loan
secured by real property, subject to certain regulatory exceptions. 24
One of these exceptions is the de minimis25 appraisal threshold. In
short, banks are not required to obtain an appraisal for any federal
loans under $250,000.26 This means that the current threshold
exempts a majority of all residential real estate loans from the

22. Weissman, supra note 13, at 5.
23. Id.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 3350(4). (The term 'federally related transaction' means any
real estate related financial transaction which; (a) a federal financial
institutions regulatory agency or the Resolution Trust Corporation engages in,
contracts for, or regulates; and (b) requires the services of an appraiser”); see
also Weissman, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining that appraisal regulations
recognize that there are circumstances when a prudent lending decision can be
made on a loan secured by real estate without an appraisal).
Under regulations established by FIRERA, an appraisal performed by a
state licensed appraiser is waived in real estate transactions in the
following circumstances: (i) the transaction value is $250,000 or less, (ii)
a lien on real property has been taken as collateral solely through an
“abundance of caution” and, as consequence, where the terms of the
transaction have not been made more favorable than they would have
been in the absence of the lien, (iii) a real estate lease is entered into, (iv)
the loan is a business loan of $1 million or less, and repayment does not
depend on the sale of the real estate or rental income, (v) there is a loan
renewal due to the maturation of an existing credit, and (vi) a regulated
institution purchases a loan or interest in a loan, pooled loans, provided
that appraisal for each pooled loan or interest met requirements of these
regulations at the time or origination).
Id.
25. William H. Green, John Russell, Phillip Gainey, Gil Santana, & Linda
Fusco, Regulatory Issues Facing the Real Estate Appraisal Profession:
Unintended Consequences of the Dodd-Frank Law and Potential Remedies, AM.
SOC’Y OF APPRAISERS, 1, 11 (2015), http://www.appraisers.org/docs/defaultsource/discipline_rp/regulatory-issues-facing-the-appraisal-profession_fullwhite-paper_042915.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (discussing the di minimis appraisal
threshold exception). This exception is the dollar amount set by federal financial
regulators exempting real estate loans under $250,000.00 made by federally
insured financial institutions from certain statutory requirements. Id.
26. See ICAP Board, Commercial Appraisal De Minis Proposal, APPRAISER
BLOGS, (Mar. 27, 2017), www.appraisersblogs.com/commercial-appraisalthreshold-increase (noting that the Illinois Association of Realtors 2015 Annual
Report on the Illinois Housing Market, there were 155,676 sales of residential
properties in Illinois in 2015, with a median sale price of $173,000 (31% below
the current $250,000 appraisal threshold for residential mortgage loans)).
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appraisal requirement.27 With the real estate market slowly
recovering, most residential purchases fall below the threshold
amount of $250,000.28
The de minimis threshold exception removes layers of
consumer protection, which assures residential purchasers that the
value of the property supports the mortgage amount assumed. 29
Many groups have lobbied to reduce the de minimis threshold to no
avail aside from Higher-Priced Mortgage Loans30 (“HPML”).31 “In
general, HPMLs are higher-priced mortgage loans with an annual
percentage rate (“APR”) higher than a benchmark rate called the
Average Prime Offer Rate.32

B. Three Types of Appraisals
There are three basic types of property appraisals used
depending on the type of real property being appraised; these
consist of the (i) sale comparison approach, (ii) the cost approach,
and (iii) the income capitalization approach.33 For residential
appraisals, appraisers most commonly use the sales comparison
approach.34

27. Id.
28. See USPAP, 2018-2019 Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice, APPRAISAL FOUNDATION, (Jan. 1, 2018), www.appraiser
elearning.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-19-electronic-copy-ofUSPAP.pdf (discussing current real estate market trends); see also Steve
Hurlburt, Raising Appraisal De Minimis: Good or Bad For The Industry?
NERNEJ.COM, (Apr. 21, 2017) www.nerej.com/raising-appraisal-de-minimisgood-or-bad-for-the-industry-by-steve-hurlburt (noting that just recently, the
federal regulatory agencies, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury
(OCC); board of governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), agreed to raise the appraisal threshold
level from $250,000 to $500,000 for commercial real estate appraisals). They left
it untouched at $250,000 for residential. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Appraisal Rule Guide, TILA Higher-Priced Mortgage Loans (HPML)
Appraisal, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Jan. 13, 2014),
www.files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401_cfpb_tila-hpml_appraisal-ruleguide.pdf
Defining HPML’s as: “a consumer credit transaction secured by the
consumer's principal dwelling with an annual percentage rate that
exceeds the average prime offer rate for a comparable transaction as of
the date the interest rate is set by 1.5 or more percentage points for loans
secured by a first lien on a dwelling, or by 3.5 or more percentage points
for loans secured by a subordinate lien on a dwelling.”
Id.
31. Russell, supra note 25, at 11.
32. Id.
33. Wooley, supra note 15, at 360.
34. Murray, supra note 3, at 1308.
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1. The Sales Comparison Approach
Under the sales comparison approach, the appraiser deems a
property to have approximately the same value as other,
comparable properties in the area. 35 To establish a baseline value
for real property, the appraiser identifies recently sold comparable
properties in the area and then adjusts this baseline value to reflect
the value of any major differences between the comparables and the
property being appraised.36 In addition, appraisers must identify
and analyze other variables37 affecting the property’s market
value.38 These market variables tend to be dynamic, ambiguous,
and often difficult to quantify, which require the appraiser to make
assumptions39 based on the available information. 40 After carefully
analyzing comparable sales data in the area and adjusting for other
relevant variables, the appraiser should arrive at a “figure that
reflects the fair market value of the appraised property.” 41
2. The Cost Approach
The cost approach is based on the appraised value of the land
itself.42It adds the replacement or reproduction cost, such as the cost
of improvements as if they were built at the time of the appraisal,
then it subtracts all accrued depreciation of the improvements.43
Generally, the cost approach method is best used for valuation of
new or improved property with a unique purpose.44 In addition, it is
used when comparable sales are unavailable and the new or
improved property does not produce income (i.e. schools, churches,
or libraries).45 A drawback of this method is that the actual market
value often differs from the current cost to reproduce a particular
structure.46 In appraising older buildings, an accurate measure of
depreciation may be impossible.47

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1309.
37. Id. For example, an appraiser might consider the effects of existing or
reasonably probable land-use regulations, zoning, or trends in the local real
estate market. Id.
38. Wooley, supra note 15, at 360.
39. Murray, supra note 3, at 1309. For example, an appraiser evaluating a
property subject to a potential zoning ordinance would need to make
assumptions regarding both the likelihood of the ordinance’s enactment and the
effect of the ordinance on the property’s market value. Id.
40. Murray, supra note 3, at 1309.
41. Id.
42. Wooley, supra note 15, at 363.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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3. The Income Capitalization Approach
The income capitalization approach is a complex appraisal
approach that tends to confuse courts and non-appraisers.48 This
approach is used to develop valuations for emerging
developments.49 It is based on the premise that a property’s value is
related to the income it can produce.50 The income capitalization
approach is commonly used to value commercial property, the worth
of which is based on its earning capacity. 51 This involves a
“determination of value by estimating the future income of a
property, then using certain data and mathematical calculations to
determine the present value of property.”52 In order to arrive at a
credible opinion of value, the appraiser must accurately estimate
income and expenses, select the proper capitalization rate, and use
the proper technique to convert the projected net income stream
into current value.53 The most significant drawback of this system
is that the appraiser makes a large number of estimates pertaining
to a number of variables involved.54

C. Real Estate Market Collapse
1. Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s
During the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, inaccurate and
inflated real estate appraisals played a significant role in the
collapse of hundreds of financial institutions and the loss of billions
of dollars.55 Lending institutions and banks relied on fraudulent
and inflated appraisals in order to provide loans that were
insufficiently56 secured by the actual collateral value. 57 As a result,

48. Id.
49. Accessory Dwelling Units May Have Higher Values when Using Income
Approach: The Appraisal Journal, APPRAISAL INSTITUTE (Nov. 20, 2012),
www.appraisalinstitute.org/accessory-dwelling-units-may-have-higher-valueswhen-using-income-approach-the-appraisal-journal/.
50. Wooley, supra note 15, at 361.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 362.
53. Id.
54. Id. For example, one of the most significant assumptions in the income
approach is of the future income stream, which includes predictability of the
rate of inflation essential to the capitalization rate selected. Id.
55. See USPAP, supra note 28 (explaining in detail history of the Loan and
Savings Crisis of 1980s).
56. Murray, supra note 3, at 1303. In 1985, the portfolios of more than eight
hundred federally insured the portfolios of more than eight hundred federally
insured lending institutions contained under-secured loans supported by real
estate appraisals that overvalued collateral properties by an aggregate of $3
billion. Id.
57. Id.
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banking institutions went insolvent58 when borrowers defaulted on
these loans and were unable to recoup loan balances that exceeded
collateral values.59
In response to the Savings and Loan Crisis60 of 1980s, Congress
conducted an extensive examination of the appraisal industry,
which revealed that one factor in particular contributed to the
inaccuracy of real estate appraisals – the frequency with which
appraisers submitted to pressures from parties involved in the loanorigination process.61 They were pressured to report sufficient
predetermined property values for borrowers to qualify for the
requested loan.62 Such misconduct often went unchecked because
the appraisal industry maintained its own policies and procedures,
and industry participants were unwilling to cooperate and
discipline dishonest or incompetent appraisers. 63
Ultimately, appraisal inaccuracy became so pervasive that
Congress declared it a “serious national problem” requiring broad
corrective measures.64 Taxpayers were ordered to bail out banking
institutions and Congress was forced to act with significant
legislative reform at the end of 1980’s.65 The most significant piece
of legislation passed by Congress was the Financial Institutions
Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (“FIRRERA”) of 1989 66 more
commonly known as the Savings and Loan Bailout Bill. 67 “Title XI
of FIRREA set up a real estate appraiser regulatory system
involving federal and state government and The Appraisal
Foundation.”68
Title XI of the Act was designed to address the problem of
incompetent and fraudulent appraisals, and promote the accuracy
58. Wooley, supra note 15, at 358. Many of the failed institutions held
mortgages for which the appraisals were grossly inaccurate or insufficiently
documented. Id. It was discovered that eighty-eight percent of failed savings
and loans associations violated federal regulations, which required current
appraisals for loans secured by real estate. Id.
59. Murray, supra note 3, at 1303.
60. See Savings and Loan Crisis, FED. RESERVE HISTORY,
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings_and_loan_crisis,
(last
visited on Apr. 22, 2019) (explaining that “in the 1980s, the financial sector
suffered through a period of distress that was focused on the nation’s savings
and loan industry”). At the center of the crisis was the dramatic increase of
inflation and interest rates during the 1970s and early 1980s. Id.
61. Murray, supra note 3, at 1303. Parties involved in the loan-originated
process pressured appraisers to supply predetermined values rather than
independent and accurate opinions of market value in exchange of promises for
continued business. Id.
62. Weissman, supra note 13, at 10-12.
63. Murray, supra note 3, at 1303.
64. Id. at 1304.
65. See Savings and Loan Crisis, supra note 60 (discussing the taxpayer
bailout).
66. Wooley, supra note 15, at 358.
67. USPAP, supra note 28.
68. See id. (discussing the history of FIRRERA of 1989).
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and reliability of appraisals used in connection with federal
mortgage loans.69 The Act included a provision that mandated all
appraisals be “independently and impartially prepared” in
writing.70 In addition, to promote transparency in the financial
sector, Title XI also created a complex regulatory system 71 where
“regulatory responsibilities are distributed among federal, state,
and private agencies.”72 Consequently in 1989, Congress adopted
the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice
(USPAP)73 to set out the ethical performance standards for the
appraisal profession in the United States. 74 Through FIRREA, the
Federal government has mandated that the states enforce real
property appraiser compliance with the USPAP standards. 75

69. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Legal-Framework,
APPRAISAL
SUB-COMMITTEE,
https://www.asc.gov/Legal-Framework/
TitleXI.aspx (last visited on Apr. 22, 2019).
Title XI’s purpose is to provide that federal financial and public policy
interests in real estate transactions will be protected by requiring that
real estate appraisals utilized in connection with federally related
transactions are performed in writing, in accordance with uniform
standards, by individuals whose competency has been demonstrated and
whose professional conduct will be subject to effective supervision.
Id.
70. Murray, supra note 3, at 1304.
71. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 69
(explaining that the Appraisal Subcommittee (ACS) of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) was created on August 9, 1989,
pursuant to Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (Title XI)).
To carry out the purpose of Title XI, Congress empowered ACS to: (1)
monitor requirements established by the States and their appraiser
regulatory agencies for certification and licensing of appraisers, (2)
maintain a national registry of state licensed and certified appraisers,
(3) monitor and review practices, procedures, activities, and
organizational structure of the Appraisal Foundation, and (4) monitor
requirements established by the Agencies regarding appraisal standards
for federally related transactions. Title XI also created a unique
relationship between the States, private sector, and the Federal
Government by authorizing the private sector to establish uniform
appraisal-practice standards.
Id.
72. Murray, supra note 3, at 1304.
73. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 1 (requiring compliance for state-licensed
and state-certified appraisals involved in federally related real estate
transactions). USPAP is updated every two years in accordance with any
market changes, and so that appraisers have proper information they need to
deliver credible and unbiased opinions of value. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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2. The 2007-2009 Real Estate Market Crash and the Great
Recession
In spite of the passage of Title XI by Congress, inaccurate and
fraudulent appraisals remained very problematic.76 During the
early 2000s, inflated appraisals were commonly used to support
subprime loans77 that were sold to government-sponsored entities
(GSEs), such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 78 The GSEs used
mortgages and packaged them as mortgage-backed securities and
sold them to investors on the secondary 79 mortgage market.80 In
such real estate transactions, lenders and investors rely on
appraisals in evaluating the quality of the loans supporting the
securities they purchased.81
The GSE secondary market significantly sped up the flow of
mortgage finance capital, making real estate values more liquid,
keeping interest rates low, spurring lenders to increase borrower
demand creatively by offering mortgage products promising little or
no equity and a small initial monthly payment.82 As the real estate
market was booming, these creative mortgage products were
supported by inflated appraisals that fueled rapid and
unsustainable growth83 in the housing market.”84 In 2008, due to
rapidly declining market conditions and home values dropping
below seventy-five percent of the amounts owed on mortgages,85
mortgage defaults sky-rocketed, causing losses to investors in
mortgage-related securities.86 Consequently in 2008, the Federal

76. Murray, supra note 3, at 1304.
77. See David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow
Predatory Lending to Flourish the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 985, 994 (2006) (noting that “subprime lending has been a significant and
growing portion of this activity, reaching nearly 20% of all originations in
2004”). “Subprime lending is the extension of credit to those with lower
incomes, less wealth, and riskier credit profiles than traditional, “prime”
borrowers.” Id.
78. Murray, supra note 3, at 1308.
79. See KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES § 1.1 (2005) (noting that the secondary mortgage market is easiest
to visualize as “a network of lenders who sell and investors who buy existing
mortgages or mortgage-backed securities). This infusion of capital from
investors provides mortgage lenders and other loan originators with a market
for their interests. Id.
80. Murray, supra note 3, at 1305.
81. Id. at 1308.
82. Boyack, supra, note 2, at 941.
83. See id. (noting that in 2010, the mortgage balances exceeded home values
by an estimated $745 billion).
84. Id.
85. See Andrew J. Ceresney et al., Regulatory Investigations and the Credit
Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 227-28 (2009)
(discussing declining market conditions).
86. Ann Graham, Introduction: Reforming the Secondary Mortgage Market,
35 HAMLINE L. REV. 327, 330 (2012).
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Housing Finance Agency placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
conservatorship.87 “As of September 2010, the combined debt and
obligations of these GSEs totaled $6.7 trillion – $2.7 trillion below
the total publicly held debt of the USA. 88 In short, the “financial
crisis of 2007-2009 caused trillions of dollars in losses to the general
economy and led to hundreds of billions in federal bailouts.”89
3. The Aftermath of the Great Recession
a. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act
In response to the Subprime Mortgage and Financial Crisis of
2007-2009 (also known as the Great Recession), Congress signed
into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“The Dodd-Frank Act”).90 This was
Congress’s attempt to address the shortcomings in federal
regulatory oversight and risk management failures resulting in the
Great Recession.91 Most provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act relate to
87. See FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, FHFA as Conservator of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-ofFannie-Mae--Freddie-Conservatorships.aspx (last visited on Apr. 23, 2019)
(describing that on July 30, 2008, President George W. Bush signed Public Law
110-289, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), which
established FHFA, giving the agency authority to place regulated entities into
conservatorship or receivership). Conservatorship is intended to stabilize
troubled institutions with the objective of maintaining normal business
operations and restoring financial safety and soundness. Id.
On September 6, 2008, FHFA used its authorities to place Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. This was in response to a
substantial deterioration in the housing markets that severely damaged
Fannie Mae and Freddie Macs’ financial condition and left them unable
to fulfill their mission without government intervention. It allows them
to preserve and conserve their assets and property and restores them to
a sound financial condition so they can continue to fulfill their statutory
mission of promoting liquidity and efficiency in the nation's housing
finance markets. A key component of the conservatorships is the
commitment of the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide financial
support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to enable them to continue to
provide liquidity and stability to the mortgage market. The Treasury
Department has provided $189.5 billion in support, which includes an
initial placement of $1 billion in both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at
the time of the conservatorships and an additional cumulative $187.5
billion investment from the Treasury Department.
Id.; Graham, supra note 86, at 2.
88. Graham, supra note 86, at 2.
89. Kristin Johnson, Steven A. Ramirez, & Cary Martin Shelby, Diversifying
to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd-Frank Section 342 Help Stabilize Financial Sector?
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795, 1819 (2016).
90. Id. at 1803.
91. Russell, supra note 25, at 6. The Dodd Frank Act expands protections to
the federal oversight of the country’s financial and economic health with respect
to monitoring systematic risk posed by institutions that may be “too big to fail.
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a system of federal regulatory controls of large financial
institutions.92
Congress declared the Act “[t]o promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system, […] to protect the American taxpayers by
ending bailouts, and to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices.”93 The Dodd-Frank Act also created three new
federal agencies,94 including the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”).95 The CFPB has the rulemaking authority with
respect to all institutions offering financial services or products to
consumers and to all mortgage transactions.96
In short, this complex web of federal legislation 97 was designed
to protect the general public from the negative consequences of bad
business decisions of many financial institutions. 98 “The DoddFrank Act created sweeping changes for the regulation of real estate
appraisers and appraisals in the United States.”99 One of the biggest
changes is a set of new regulatory guidelines to combat fraudulent
appraisals.100 The goal is to prevent unscrupulous mortgage
brokers from pressuring appraisers – whether by payments,
threats, or promises – from delivering predetermined valuations.101
The Dodd-Frank Act imposes registration and supervision of third-

Id.

92. See Boyack, supra note 2, at 967 (stating that the Dodd-Frank Act
authorizes the Federal Reserve to control the growth and financial products
offered by institutions the failure of which would pose a “grave threat” to
financial stability of the country, and includes the Volcker Rule, which disallows
certain proprietary trading or investing by banks or related institutions).
93. USPAP, supra note 28.
94. See Boyack, supra note 2, at 967 (stating that the Financial Stability
Oversight Council is made up of financial regulators from ten federal agencies
and is tasked with identifying risks to nation’s financial stability and protecting
economic stability). The Office of Financial Research provides information to aid
in the Council’s function. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The CFPB also has five departments that focus on a wide range of
issues including research, community affairs, complaint tracking, and
collection, ensuring equitable access to credit and promoting financial literacy
among consumers. Id.
97. Johnson, Ramirez, & Shelby, supra note 89, at 1798 (explaining that
banking laws for example, include specific capital and reserve requirements,
governance mandates, and detailed licensing standards, to reduce systemic
risk). Federal securities laws include an intricate mandatory disclosure
framework for public companies to protect investors and to promote efficient
and transparent markets. Id.
98. Boyack, supra note 2, at 1798.
99. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 69,
at 1 (describing how the Dodd-Frank Act impacted appraisal regulation).
100. Beatrice Zagorski, How Does the Dodd-Frank Act Impact the Appraisal
Process, MORTGAGE ORB (Dec. 14, 2011), www.mortgageorb.com/how-does-thedodd-frank-act-impact-the-appraisal-process.
101. Id.
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party appraisal management companies.102 It also substantially
amends Title XI of FIRREA, but it is still unclear how some of its
provisions affect State and Federal regulation.103
b. The Appraisal Foundation
In 2011, the Appraiser Qualifications Board (“AQB”) of the
Appraisal Foundation104 adopted changes to the appraiser
qualifications criteria that became effective January 1, 2015. 105
These new changes establish minimum education, experience, and
examination requirements106 for real property appraisers to obtain
a state license or certification.107 Although the Appraisal
Foundation is not an enforcement agency and does not have
authority to receive or process complaints against the appraisers,
states are nonetheless required to implement appraiser licensing
and certification requirements that are no less stringent than those
required by the AQB.108
c.

15 U.S.C. 1639H- Property Appraisal Requirements

In 2012, Congress passed 15 U.S.C. 1639H – Property
Appraisal Requirements, which mandates the use of written
appraisals for any higher-risk mortgage loan (also known as higherpriced mortgage loan)109 by a licensed appraiser.110 The statute also
requires creditors to provide one copy of each appraisal to the
applicant without charge, and at least three days prior to the closing
date.111 Section 1639H also imposes a $2,000 fine on any creditor
who is found to have willfully failed to obtain an appraisal as
102. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 69,
at 1 (discussing required supervision under the Dodd-Frank Act of appraisal
management companies).
103. Id.
104. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 1 (stating that the Appraisal Foundation
was authorized by Congress as the source of appraisal standards and appraiser
qualifications).
105. Id.
106. See id. (noting the following examples: national uniform licensing and
certification examinations, background screening for new applicants as well as
existing credential holders, good-standing rules regarding supervisory
appraisers and trainee appraisers, added topics on green buildings, seller
concessions, and developing opinions of value of real property in appraisals
which include personal or business property).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.35 (2019) (providing a definition of a “higher-priced
mortgage loan,” which means “a closed-end consumer credit transaction”
secured by the consumer's principal dwelling with an annual percentage rate
that exceeds the average prime offer rate for a comparable transaction as of the
date the interest rate is set).
110. Property Appraisal Requirements, 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h) (2015).
111. Id.
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required per this section.112
d. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
In 2015, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
(“CFPB”) published financial rules implementing changes to the
Dodd-Frank Act escrow requirements of higher-priced mortgage
loans (“HPMLs”)113 under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). 114 The
CFPB also adopted a new appraisal disclosure under the Equal
Opportunity Credit Act (“EOCA”), and new appraisal rules for
HPMLs.115
The adopted changes for HMPLs under TILA require creditors
to obtain an appraisal performed by a licensed appraiser that meets
certain proscribed standards.116 Similar to 15 U.S.C. 1639H passed
by Congress; new TILA requirements mandate that creditors
provide mortgage applicants with an appraisal disclosure, and a
copy of an appraisal report at no charge.117 In addition, there are
certain compliance requirements118 for HPMLs, which lenders must

112. Id.
113. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 30, at 1 (defining
HPML as a closed-end loan). In general, a higher-priced mortgage loan is one
with an annual percentage rate, or APR, higher than a benchmark rate called
the Average Prime Offer Rate, and that is secured by the consumer’s principal
dwelling. Id.
114. Laura Hobson-Brown, Laura Greco & Robert Savoie, Dodd-Frank Act
Requirements for Escrow Accounts, High-Cost Mortgages, Homeownership
Counseling, and Appraisal Requirements Take Shape, 69 BUS. LAWYER 563
(2014).
115. Id.
116. Id. (noting that the appraisal must be performed by a certified or
licensed appraiser, who must conduct a physical visit of the interior of the
property that will secure the loan).
117. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 30, at 1.
118. See Hobson-Brown, Greco & Savoie, supra note 114 (“explaining that
in order to avail itself of the safe harbor protections, a creditor must:
(a) Order that the appraiser perform the appraisal in conformity with
the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Title XI of
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA") 78 and any implementing regulations then in effect; (b)
verify through the National Registry that the appraiser who signed the
appraiser's certification was a certified or licensed appraiser in the state
where the appraised property is located as of the date the appraiser
signed the appraiser's certification; (c) confirm that certain appraisal
elements set forth in detail in Appendix N to Regulation Z are addressed
in the written appraisal; and (d) have no actual knowledge contrary to
the facts or certifications contained in the written appraisal.
Id.
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satisfy119 before they extend the loan to borrowers.120 However, the
HPML appraisal requirements do not apply to new construction
loans, mobile home, boat, trailer, or bridge loans.121
To address shortcomings of the Great Recession, Congress
passed series of financial regulations in 2010. The most recent
financial collapse is a primary example of the painful effects of
careless mortgage lending, fueled by deterioration in loan
underwriting procedures and the quality of appraisals. 122

D. Challenges in Appraisal Regulation
1. Current Problems in the Appraisal Industry
Despite Congress’ efforts to address the 2007-2009
shortcomings in federal regulatory oversight and risk management
failure, the appraisal industry still faces three major issues. 123
First, there is lack of appraisal accuracy because of the subjective
nature and challenges in regulating external pressures. 124 Second,
there is lack of legal liability and weak disciplinary avenues for
appraiser misconduct.125 Third, federal regulation is far removed
from the transactional issues on the state level. 126
2. Lack of Accuracy and Challenges in Regulating Pressure
Despite Congress’ well-grounded legislative efforts under Title
XI mandating that appraisals be performed independently and
impartially, the degree of subjectivity and the margin of error are
still problematic in all mortgage transactions.127 Total accuracy
cannot be expected because an appraisal is a subjective opinion of
value.128 In addition, appraisers are still subject to external
pressures exerted by self-interested parties.129 These parties
119. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 30, at 1 (noting
that compliance requirements include the following: creditor must deliver a
written appraisal to the applicant within (3) business days before loan
consummation, or within (30) days if the loan will not be consummated by the
creditor, and the creditor must also deliver to the applicant a written statutory
disclosure within three days of when the creditor determines that the loan is an
HPML).
120. Hobson-Brown, Greco, & Savoie, supra note 114.
121. Id.
122. See Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter, Has The Mortgage
Pendulum Swung Too Far? Reviving Access To Mortgage Credit: Why Cyclicality
Matters to Access to Mortgage Credit, 37 B.C.J.LLI. & SOC. JUST. 361, 361 (2017).
123. Johnson, Ramirez, & Shelby, supra note 89, at 1803.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Murray, supra note 3, at 1307.
129. Id.
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include loan originators and real estate brokers who pressure
appraisers to deliver inflated opinions of value in exchange for
business referrals.130 As a result, appraisers tend to overvalue
homes, putting key mortgage industry participants at risk. 131
If borrowers are unable or unwilling to repay these excessive
mortgages, then lenders, secondary market investors, and federal
mortgage insurers suffer substantial financial losses when actual
home values cannot cover outstanding mortgage balances. 132 For
example, improper influence exerted on appraisers resulted in
many fraudulent appraisals that contributed to the 2007-2009
housing crash.133 The Appraisal Institute claims “instances of client
pressure doubled between 2005 and 2007, despite two decades of
regulatory efforts aimed at promoting appraisal accuracy.” 134
Because loan originators can exert pressure in very subtle
ways, there is a fine line between legitimate communications and
improper attempts to influence appraisals. 135 For example, lenders
and brokers can apply pressure by suggesting that an appraiser
consider different comparables that would yield higher-value
estimates, or by implying that future work is contingent on the
outcome of pending appraisals. 136 Such hints and implications may
be nothing more than casual comments or even legitimate
communications aimed at ensuring the quality of appraisals. 137 But
other times, the pressure can be forceful and direct.138
130. Id. at 1307.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 373.
134. Murray, supra note 3, at 1316.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1317.
137. Id. at 1316.
138. See id. (stating, “when appraisers submit honest appraisal values that
are insufficient to support mortgages, lenders often inform appraisers of the
values needed to complete the transactions. If appraisers refuse to revise their
appraisals to hit the numbers, lenders may refuse to pay them.”) However, some
appraiser communications are permitted. See John Brenan, The Appraisal
Foundation- Hot Topics, APPRAISALBUZZ.COM (Jan. 1, 2018) www.
appraisalbuzz.com/appraisal-foundation-hot-topics.
However, to preserve customer service relations, an appraiser should be
able to answer some basic questions about the process without being
intimidated. This concept is consistent with the provisions of the DoddFrank Act of 2010, which prohibited inappropriate contact with an
appraiser, but specifically identified the following as acceptable areas of
communication: (1) consider additional, appropriate property
information, including the consideration of additional comparable
properties to make or support an appraisal, (2) provide further detail,
substantiation, or explanation for the appraiser’s value conclusion, and
(3) correct errors in the appraisal report. We believe that appraisers
should be able to respond to such requests in a courteous, professional
manner, without impairing appraiser independence in any way.
Id.
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To address the problem of illegitimate appraiser
communications following the Great Recession,139 the federal
banking agencies in 2010 amended140 the Interagency Appraisal
and Evaluation Guidelines.141 The guidelines added a new
“independency standard,” which prohibits appraisers and persons
performing evaluations from engaging in any types of coercive
communications.142 This standard applies to anyone who orders,
performs, or reviews appraisal reports. 143
New guidelines also require that all banking and appraisal
institutions adopt sufficient policies and procedures to safeguard
against inappropriate actions that may compromise the
independence standard.144 Nevertheless, improper influence
139. Murray, supra note 3, at 1319 (explaining that “in 2008 Congress
responded with Regulation Z of the 2008 Amendments to the Truth in Lending
Act – “Regulation Z” and the Home Valuation Code of Conduct, which include
provisions that expressly prohibit lenders and brokers from pressuring
appraisers to deliver predetermined values”).
140. See Weissman, supra note 13, at 1 (explaining that the updated
guidelines supplement existing guidance and rescind the following: a statement
intended to supplement existing guidance and rescind the following: (a) 1994
Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines, FIL-74-94; (b) statement on
Appraisal Standards, FIL-20-2001;(c) Interagency Statement on Independent
Appraisal and Evaluation Functions, FIL-84-2003; and (d) 2006 Revisions to
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, FIL-53-2006).
141. See id. at 9 (defining Section V, Independence of the Appraisal and
Evaluation Program, has been expanded substantially to clarify some points
and also to address the communication process between a lending institution
and its fee appraisers). The guidelines state that independence applies to those
persons who order, perform, and review appraisals and evaluations. Id. The
standards of independence apply to both appraisals and evaluations). Id.
142. Id.
“Guidelines” contain 18 sections and 4 appendices. Section V,
Independence of the Appraisal and Evaluation Program, has been expanded
substantially to clarify some points and also to address the communication
process between a lending institution and its fee appraisers. The guidelines
state that independence applies to those persons who order, perform, and
review appraisals and evaluations. The standards of independence apply to
both appraisals and evaluations. This section also gives examples of the
types of communications that would not be construed as coercion or undue
influence on appraisers and persons performing evaluations, as well as
examples of actions that would compromise independence. Id. For example,
a permitted form of contact is to request the appraiser to correct factual
issues, provide additional information in support of basis for evaluation.
Some of the prohibited communication includes: conditioning a person’s
compensation on a loan, communicating a predetermined value or expected
value, procedures that compromise the independence of appraisal, implying
future retention of a person’s series.
Id.
143. Id. at 10-13.
144. See id. (including but not limited to; communicating a predetermined
value, specifying a minimum value requirement, conditioning a person’s
compensation on loan consummation, failing to compensate a person or
excluding such person because of a low opinion of value).
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exerted on appraisers is a serious problem that is difficult to
enforce.145 Existing regulatory efforts, which require the appraisal
independence standard or otherwise prohibit pressuring of the
appraisers, are not only impractical but also difficult to invoke. 146
3. Lack of Legal Liability and Weak Disciplinary Avenues
Aside from disciplinary sanctions and monetary fines, there is
very little accountability for appraiser misconduct in the legal
system. The Appraisal Foundation is not an enforcement agency
and it does not have authority to process complaints for appraiser
misconduct.147 Accordingly, state agencies are in charge of enforcing
disciplinary actions against appraisers who do not comply with
state law or the USPAP.148 Each state maintains its own agency
that establishes licensing, education, and experience requirements
that, at a minimum, must satisfy the AQB criteria.149
For example, in Illinois, the Illinois Department of Financial
Professional Regulation (“IDFPR”) and its Division of Real Estate
is in charge of licensing, and it regulates all professionals involved
in “buying and selling property, including real estate brokers,
appraisers, auctioneers, community association managers, home
inspectors, and timeshare/land sale developers and agents.” 150
According to the IDFPR’s Professional Regulation report issued in
2015, only five complaints against individual appraisers were
investigated and prosecuted.151 All of these complaints resulted in
monetary fines and license suspension.152
Allegations of appraiser misconduct are investigated by state
agencies that impose disciplinary sanctions for any action not in
145. Murray, supra note 3, at 1319.
146. Id.
147. USPAP, supra note 28, at 1. Rather, it’s a not-for-profit organization
dedicated to the advancement of professional standards required by the
appraisal profession. Id.; see also Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, supra note 69, at 1 (describing the limited powers of the Appraisal
Foundation).
148. USPAP, supra note 28, at 1.
149. Id.
150. Real Estate Appraisal, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, www.idfpr.com/profs/appraisal.asp (last visited on
Apr. 22, 2019).
151. See id. (describing incidents of appraiser misconduct).
152. Id. All of these complaints resulted in monetary fines and license
suspension. Once incident involved a Naperville appraiser who was suspended
for a minimum of five years and fined $5,000 for “developing and
communicating a series of misleading appraisals that contained a series of
errors or omissions and exceeded the scope of Respondent’s license. Id. Another
incident involved a misconduct case where a licensed appraiser from Greenfield,
Illinois was reprimanded and fined $3,000 for acting outside the scope of his
license and appraising three properties that require a Certified General Real
Estate Appraiser license. Id. The IDFPR determined that he lacked credibility
and his appraisal report contained significant errors and omissions. Id.
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compliance with state regulations and the USPAP. 153 But there is
very little recourse in the court of law for those who rely on
fraudulent appraisals, because fraud is a difficult standard to
prove.154 Similarly, suits against appraisers for negligence rarely
succeed, as the “opinion defense” has often been successfully
asserted.155 In recent years, it has become painfully apparent that
the legal system serves as a bar to recovery for those who relied on
fraudulent appraisal values.156
4. Lack of Federal Enforcement of Appraiser Regulations
There is a lack of federal enforcement of appraisal regulations
on the state level. First, under authority granted by Title XI, federal
regulators have adopted laws that exempt federal mortgage
transactions valued at $250,000 or less from the appraisal
requirement.157 This exemption is referred to as the de minimis

153. Id.
154. Murray, supra note 3, at 1318. Allegations of fraud require proof of an
intentional misrepresentation of a material fact, so unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that an appraiser intentionally deviated from his
independent judgment, a cause of action for fraud will be unsuccessful. Id.; see
e.g., Tsereteli v. Res. Asset Sect. Trust 2006-A8, 692 F. Supp. 3d 387, 393
(S.D.N.Y 2010) (holding that fraud claims based on appraisals have been
dismissed on the ground that an appraisal is a subjective opinion and is not
actionable absent an allegation that the appraiser did not believe the appraisal
at the time it was issued); see also In re IndyMac Mtge.-Backed Secs. Litig., 718
F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (holding that fraud claims involving appraisals
have also been dismissed where the complaint pleaded only general allegations
that the appraisers were subject to pressure from the banking industry to
inflate their appraisals, and not that the appraisers of the loans at issue
succumbed to such pressure; see e.g. Plumber’s Union Local No. 12 Pension
Fund v. Nomura Asset Accept. Corp., 632 F.3d 762 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing
specificity requirements to plead a claim for undue appraiser pressure). An
appraisal is an opinion of value and thus some margin of error is expected.
Murray, supra note 3, at 1318; see also Peter J. Hartmann Co. v. Capital Bank
& Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 593, 601 (1998) (acknowledging that an expression
of opinion will not support an action for fraud). As a result, it is exceptionally
difficult to prove that an inflated appraisal is the product of an improper
influence as opposed to an erroneous, but good faith opinion of value that is still
within the allowed margin of error. Murray, supra note 3, at 1318.
155. See Wooley, supra note 15, at 363 (acknowledging that where no
negligence is proven, courts generally recognize the likelihood of differing
opinions of value). Courts have determined that the use of the word “estimate”
on the appraisal report is synonymous with “opinion” and thus, the appraisal
report could not support an actionable, negligent misrepresentation. See
Sampen v. Dabrowski, 222 Ill. App. 3d 918, 924 (1991) (holding that appraisal
is an opinion of value and thus is not a negligent misrepresentation actionable
in court). Consequently, claims based on fraudulent appraisals rarely succeed.
Wooley, supra note 15, at 363. Rather, the legal system serves as a bar to
recovery to appraisal misrepresentation. Id.
156. Wooley, supra note 15, at 363.
157. Russell, supra note 25, at 10.
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threshold.158 For example, if the purchase price of real property is
$250,000 or less, an appraisal performed by a licensed appraiser is
not required.159 The de minimis threshold creates a huge regulatory
gap. This gap removes a substantial amount of mortgage
transactions from any appraiser-related federal regulation.
Essentially, every consumer buying a house with a fair market
value below $250,000 is without protection against fraudulent
mortgage lending practices by big banks. 160 Second, the Dodd-Frank
Act is too far removed from transactions on the state level. It does
not apply to non-federal mortgage loans, and it only requires an
independent and written appraisal for higher-risk mortgage
loans.161 Since, the Dodd-Frank Act only regulates federal
mortgage-loans, many states still lack mandatory licensing
requirements for appraisers.162 To illustrate, a borrower who is
working with a local lender (who is not federally-regulated) in a
state where appraiser licensing is not required is not afforded any
of the consumer protections provided by the Dodd-Frank Act.163

E. Freddie Mac and the Use of Automatic Collateral
Evaluation Products (“ACEs”)
There is also disagreement over the required degree of
accuracy in valuing real property in residential mortgage
transactions.164 The traditional view on lending, values the use of
licensed real estate appraisers for their training, experience, and
expertise necessary to provide a credible opinion of value.165 In
recent years, particularly in the residential sector, there has been a
lot of proliferation of products and processes attempting to provide
alternatives to traditional appraisals. 166 The development of new
loan products accustomed to today’s real estate encourages the use
of alternative valuation products (“AVPs”) in order to decrease
borrower’s loan origination costs and improve the timeline for
mortgage approval process.167

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Accessory Dwelling Units May Have Higher Values when Using Income
Approach: The Appraisal Journal, supra note 49.
161. See Boyack, supra note 2, at 971 (explaining that the Dodd-Frank Act
does not apply to non-federal mortgage transactions).
162. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 69, at
1.
163. Murray, supra note 3, at 1306.
164. Wooley, supra note 15, at 362.
165. Brenan, supra note 138, at 29-32.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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1. Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are two of the largest, for-profit,
and privately owned mortgage finance companies in the United
States.168 After the Great Depression, Congress found a way to
provide local banks with federal money to stabilize the U.S. housing
market.169 It created these institutions “to develop a liquid national
market for residential mortgages in order to encourage
homeownership.”170 Initially, ownership of their stock was limited
to other financial institutions, but later, the stock was converted so
that it could be owned and traded by all investors. 171 Today, Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mac make up the modern secondary mortgage
market, and recently have become the biggest proponents of using
ACEs in a vast majority of residential mortgage transactions. 172
2. The Great Recession
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship
in 2008 and had received approximately $169 billion in bailout
funds from the U.S. Treasury. 173 Accounting scandals and
mismanagement led to a recent investigation by the Justice
Department and the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”). 174
The investigation revealed accounting errors in the amount of 4.5
to 4.7 billion dollars, which resulted in a termination of three of the
company’s top executives.175 Ongoing investigations by Congress176

168. Id. Measured by the size of their assets, Freddie Mac’s and Fannie
Mae’s shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Id.; see also FORBES,
The
Forbes
Special
Report
of
2000,
(Mar.
30,
2006),
www.forbes.com/lists/2006/18/06f2000_The-Forbes-2000_Assets.html (showing
Fannie Mae ranked at thirty-seven and Freddie Mac ranked at two hundred);
see FANNIE MAE, www.fanniemae.com/faq/faq8.jhtml? p=FAQ (last visited Apr.
22, 2019) (describing Fannie Mae as a private company); see also FREDDIE MAC,
www.freddiemac.com (last visited on Apr. 22, 2019) (announcing that Freddie
Mac common stock will continue to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange.”);
see also Reiss on Federal Government, supra note 4, at 1019 (discussing Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac as private companies).
169. Graham, supra note 86, at 2.
170. Reiss on Federal Government, supra note 4, at 1019.
171. Graham, supra note 86, at 2. “The business models and mortgage loanrelated activities for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac changed over time, beginning
with Fannie Mae's original focus on creating a secondary mortgage market, and
later, standardized conventional residential mortgage loans.” Id.
172. New Program to Help Buyers Bypass Appraisals, REALTOR.ORG, (Aug.
8, 2017) www.realtormag.realtor.org/daily-news/2017/08/21/new-program-helpbuyers-bypass-appraisals (proposing that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are
both proponents of the automated collateral evaluations).
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id.
176. See SEC v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., Et Al., 07-CV-1728 (U.S.D.C,
D.D.C 2007) (noting that on September 27, 2007, the Securities Exchange
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and the House Finance Services subcommittee 177 will determine the
future role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the secondary
mortgage market that they dominate.178 There is still significant
uncertainty as to whether Freddie Mac will ever emerge from
conservatorship.179
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are privately owned financial
institutions.180 Currently, they control about ninety percent of the
nation's secondary mortgage market. 181 Collectively, these two
entities guarantee roughly sixty percent of mortgages in the United
States.182 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae help mortgage originators
package their mortgages into residential mortgage-backed
securities (“RMBS”) by providing credit guarantees for those
securities.183 They raise capital by issuing debt securities through
the world’s financial markets and use those funds to purchase
mortgages and related securities.184 In short, Freddie and Fannie
Mae do not make mortgages, but buy them from lenders, wrap them
into securities and make guarantees to investors if the loans
default.185 Those two activities have driven the rapid growth and
high profitability of these two companies in recent years.186

Commission filed a settled enforcement action charging Freddie Mac with
securities fraud in connection with improper earnings management).
The SEC's Complaint alleges that Freddie Mac engaged in a fraudulent
scheme that deceived investors about its true performance, profitability,
and growth trends, and that in 2000, 2001 and 2002 the Company
misreported its net income in each of those years by 30.5%, 23.9% and
42.9%. In its settlement with the Commission, Freddie Mac agreed,
without admitting or denying the allegations, to the entry of a final
judgment that permanently enjoins the Company from violations of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, and
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, which are anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws. Freddie Mac also agreed to pay a $50 million civil
penalty.
Id.
177. See id. (noting that the House Finance Services Subcommittee oversees
the activity of GSEs).
178. Graham, supra note 86, at 3.
179. Brian Taylor Goldman, The Indefinite Conservatorship of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac is a State-Action, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 11, 12 (2017).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Goldman, supra note 179, at 3.
183. See id. (discussing residential mortgage backed securities “RMBSs.”)
184. Id.
185. Joe Light, The Next Job Humans Lose to Robots; Real Estate Appraiser,
BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2017), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-11/
the-next-job-humans-lose-to-robots-real-estate-appraiser.
186. Reiss on Federal Government, supra note 4, at 1022.
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3. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae Are Not Subject to
Appraisal Regulations
With the exceptions of HIMLs, “loans backed by government
agencies and government sponsored enterprises are exempt from
the appraisal requirements, which means that loans insured by the
FHA187 have their own appraisal requirements, and loans bought
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are determined by the agencies
themselves.”188 Since Freddie Mac is exempt from federal statutory
requirements regarding appraisals, it generally only requires them
to evaluate the risk in the purchase of RSMBs. 189 Since the most
recent financial crisis, Freddie Mac adheres to the underlying
appraisal requirement.190
Freddie Mac, the proponent of the Automated Collateral
Evaluations (“ACEs”), took the lead and initiated a new program to
help borrowers bypass the traditional appraisal, which became
effective on September 1, 2017. 191 This program allows for certain
federal loans backed by Freddie Mac to use the ACEs 192 to
determine the real property’s collateral value and evaluate the
lending risk.193 The ACE uses data generated from various
computer models such as the multiple listing service (“MLS”), public
records, and wealth of historical home values published online. 194
They use a mathematical modeling, drawing on a huge database of

187. See Accessory Dwelling Units May Have Higher Values when Using
Income Approach: The Appraisal Journal, supra note 49 (explaining that by
statute, FHA maintains an appraisal requirement for all federal loans because
the risk associated with the FHA insurance fund).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. New Program to Help Buyers Bypass Appraisals, REALTOR.ORG (Aug.
8, 2017) www.realtormag.realtor.org/daily-news/2017/08/21/new-program-helpbuyers-bypass-appraisals.
192. Freddie Mac Introduced Innovative Appraisal Alternative, FREDDIE
MAC
(Aug.
18,
2017)
www.freddiemac.mwnewsroom.com/pressreleases/freddie-mac-introduces-innovative-appraisal-altern-otcqb-fmcc1318582.
To find out if a property is eligible for ACE, lenders must submit loan
data through Loan Product Advisor®, the cornerstone of Loan Advisor
Suite®. Loan Advisor Suite is Freddie Mac's smart end-to-end technology
solution that assesses credit, capacity and collateral to help lenders
validate the quality of the loans they originate. Lenders receive real-time
risk assessment feedback and information about the loans.
Id.
193. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 1 (discussing reasons why Freddie Mac
is opting for the automatic collateral evaluations).
194. Lisa Tibbitts, Freddie Mac Introduces Innovative Appraisal Alternative
for Home Purchases and Refinances, FREDDIE MAC, (Aug. 18, 2017).
www.freddiemac.mwnewsroom.com/press-releases/freddie-mac-introducesinnovative-appraisal-altern-otcqb-fmcc-1318582.
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recent transactions, complete with property characteristics, to
generate an estimates sales price.195 Freddie claims ACEs are cost
effective because they can reduce borrowers loan origination costs
up to $500, and they provide immediate collateral valuations, which
allow the lender to close up to ten days sooner.196 Although a
traditional appraisal may still be needed for some home purchase
transactions, the use of ACEs gives Freddie substantial control over
lender’s requirements for approving the loan.197

III. ANALYSIS
This section will compare and contrast the two competing
views regarding the use of appraisals in residential mortgage
transactions: the traditional approach with the modern approach,
which uses the automated collateral evaluation products (“ACEs”).
Section “A” will present the traditional view, which emphasizes the
importance of using an accurate and independent appraisal in
residential mortgage transactions. Section “B” presents arguments
in favor of the modern view—based on the use of ACEs. Section “C”
presents risks associated with the use of ACEs. Finally, this section
concludes with a comparison of these two approaches and how they
affect residential mortgage transactions.

A. Traditional View – Accurate Appraisals Are Critical
to the Health of Mortgage Industry
1. Assurance for Lender
Advocates of the traditional approach argue that a
conventional (i.e. traditional) appraisal is not only essential but also
critical to the health of mortgage industry.198 Appraisal acts as an
assurance for the lender, who relies upon the value of real property
to ensure repayment of the loan if the borrower defaults.199 The
combined loan-to-value (“CLTV”)200 ratio is the single most
important predictor of default.201 The use of an appraisal enables
lenders to compute the CLTV ratio and determine whether an

195. Laurie Goodman & Jun Zhu, A Significantly Improved Appraisal
Process Has Reduced The Riskiness of Refinanced Mortgage, URBAN INST., (Mar.
7, 2019) (available at www.urban.org/urban-wire/significantly-improvedappraisal-process-has-reduced-riskiness-refinance-mortgages).
196. USPAP, supra note 28, at 4.
197. Tibbitts, supra note 194, at 1.
198. Wooley, supra note 15, at 360.
199. Id.
200. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 373 (explaining that
combined loan-to-value (CLTV) are ratios that are computed based on the
appraised value of the property).
201. Id.
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applicant’s down payment or home equity will be sufficient to
contain default risk.202
Proponents of the traditional view argue that removing a
conventional appraisal and substituting it with other valuation
products will not only loosen the underwriting procedures but will
ultimately lead to another housing crash.203 This proposition stems
from the fact that during the mid-2000s credit boom, key mortgage
lending standards substantially deteriorated.204 The single most
important determinant of default risk – the average combined loanto-value ratio – went up while another crucial loan quality indicator
– the percentage of full documentation underwriting – went
down.205 Supporters of the traditional view say that ACEs will
diminish underwriting procedures by relying on computergenerated data that may not be reliable at the time of valuation. 206
Although an appraisal is not the central factor taken into
consideration when banks evaluate borrowers creditworthiness, it
is nonetheless essential to determine the proper loan amount. 207
Despite the dissenting view that traditional appraisals no longer
play a central role in credit approval process, lenders still consider
the value of collateral to be as important, as borrower’s ability to
pay due to the increasing use of nonrecourse mortgages.208 Although
a traditional appraisal is still at risk for being inaccurate due to
human error, solely relying on automated valuations generated
from various computer sources carries a more substantial risk of
grossly disproportionate inflation. 209
2. Safeguard to Keep Big Banks at Bay
a. Appraisal Cyclicality and Subprime Lending
There are two competing views concerning the role of an
appraisal in residential mortgage transactions. On one hand,
advocates of the traditional approach argue that it protects
consumers from exploitation by big banks, such as Freddie Mac. 210
Banks are inherently fragile and prone to cyclicality due to the term
mismatch between their short-term liabilities and their long-term
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. USPAP, supra note 28, at 4.
207. McCoy &Wachter, supra note 122, at 363.
208. See Wooley, supra note 15, at 360 (explaining that a nonrecourse
mortgage is one in which the borrower is not personally liable for repayment in
the event of default.)
209. See generally Light, supra note 185 (discussing implications of using
computer-generated data in real estate transactions).
210. See Murray, supra note 3, at 1306 (recognizing that a traditional real
estate appraisal protects consumers against big banks).
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liquid assets.211 Cyclicality fuels mortgage bubbles212 that
incorporate inflated appraisals based on recent sales comparables
(“comps”).213 These recent comps are used to justify more lending,
which artificially raises home appreciation values.214 During this
cycle, increasing home prices and loose credit, along with
government-induced lower underwriting standards, fueled massive
surge in the mortgage market participation.215
Ultimately, banks view high and raising prices as reducing
their portfolio risk216 because collateral of their previous loans is
now higher in value.217 After the financial “bubble” bursts, 218
appraisals artificially prolong economic downturns when property
values are starting to rise by limiting extensions of mortgages based
on lower, outdated comparables that erode bank’s capital, causing
lenders to withdraw from home lending.219
Although it is generally agreed that fraudulent appraisals fuel
211. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 363 (explaining that shortterm liabilities are in a form of demand deposits, and the long-term liquid assets
also include interest and loans).
212. BIG SHORT (Paramount Pictures 2015) (discussing the possibility that
the market “bubble” may pop:
Lawrence Fields: Your big mortgage bet concerns us. We have no
confidence in your ability to identify macroeconomic trends.
Michael Burry: You flew here to tell me that? Why? I mean, anyone can
see there's a real estate bubble.
Lawrence Fields: Actually, no one can see a bubble. That's what makes
it a bubble.
Michael Burry: That's dumb, Lawrence. There are always markers.
Mortgage fraud - it's quadrupled since 2000. Average take home pay is
flat yet home prices are soaring. That means homes are debts not assets.
Martin Blaine: [sarcastically] So Mike Burry of San Jose, a guy who gets
his hair cut at SuperCuts, and doesn't wear shoes, knows more than Alan
Greenspan and Hank Paulson?
Michael Burry: Dr. Mike Burry. And yes... he does.
Id.
213. McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 373.
214. Id.
215. See Lux Marshall & Robert Greene, What's Behind the NonBank Mortgage Boom? 6 (Harvard Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business &
Government, Working Paper No. 42, 2015) (noting that loan originations
increased 22 percent between 2004 and 2006).
216. McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 373 (“The single most important
determinant of default risk—the average combined loan-to-value ratio—went
up during the most recent financial crash, while another crucial loan quality
indicator—the percentage of full documentation underwriting—went down”).
217. Id.
218. Marshall & Greene, supra note 215, at 1. For example, the total
mortgage originations declined to $1.240 trillion in 2014, from $3.120 trillion in
2005. Id.
219. McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 373.
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cyclicality, proponents of the traditional approach maintain that an
appraisal is one of the very few independent sources in a mortgage
transaction.220 When a bank is required to order a traditional
appraisal,221 it loses direct control over the collateral valuation.222
Ultimately, an appraisal is a safeguard that protects consumers
from overreaching of major financial institutions. 223
Opponents of the traditional view agree that fraudulent
appraisals played a role in the financial crisis, but they strongly
believe that the secondary-mortgage market was to blame.224
Recent innovations225 in the mortgage market encouraged subprime

220. Boyack, supra note 2, at 970.
221. Assuming that it is done in compliance with the USPAP standards.
Wooley, supra note 15, at 385.
222. Id.
223. Greg Gelzinis & Joe Valenti, Fact Sheet: The Senate’s Bipartisan DoddFrank Rollback Bill, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, (Feb. 28, 2018)
www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/02/28/447264/factsheet-senates-bipartisan-dodd-frank-rollback-bill/.
224. Goldman, supra note 179, at 3.
Although Fannie and Freddie’s primary goal is to promote quality,
affordable housing by: “(a) purchasing qualifying residential loans from
mortgage originators to increase home finance market liquidity, and (b)
providing capital support to multifamily housing projects.” Fannie and
Freddie, also called government sponsored entities or “GSEs,” purchase
mortgages from originators, creating a secondary market in mortgages
(fueled by the creation of mortgage-backed securities).The secondary
market sale of mortgages, by shifting risk, allows capital to be freed for
the purpose of originating more mortgages, where the process then
repeats itself. The GSEs were particularly vital cogs in the mortgage
marketplace because they were viewed as implicitly supported by the
“full faith and credit” of the United States. As a result, the GSEs could
borrow at lower rates and secure strong credit ratings.
Id.
225. Reiss on Subprime, supra note 77, at 4. For example, before the 1980s,
Americans who wanted to buy a house would visit their local savings and loan
bank to meet with a loan officer in order to apply for the loan. Id. Since the
1980s however, due to technological, financial, and legal innovations allow
global finance companies to offer a range of mortgage products. Id. As a result
of these innovations, there has been an unbundling of the submarkets of the
mortgage industry. Id. A mortgage now can be:
(1) originated by a mortgage
origination;

broker who makes money only from

(2) serviced by a mortgage banker who did not originate the loan and
may have bought the right to service the loan from another mortgage
banker;
(3) originated with the credit risk taken by one of the secondary market
institutions, perhaps along with a mortgage insurance company; and
(4) funded by a mortgage -backed security (MBS) sold into the capital
markets , and the MBS can be packaged as a bundle of derivative
securities that separate interest rate and prepayment risk among
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lending—226 a significant and growing activity reaching nearly
twenty percent of all loan originations in 2004.227 Opponents
characterize subprime lending as a “negative consequence of change
in the mortgage industry, away from dominance and toward
relatively unregulated specialty firms.”228 Subprime lending
resulted in a great deal of abuses229 in the secondary mortgage
market, which ultimately caused the Great Recession.230
different investors”
Id.
226. Id. at 4. Subprime lending is the extension of credit to those with lower
incomes, less wealth, and riskier credit profiles than traditional, “prime”
borrower” with an 80% LTV ratio. Id.
227. Id. at 5.
228. Id.
229. See BIG SHORT, supra note 212 (discussing big bank bailouts):
Goldman Sachs Quant (Deeb): Why? Those bonds only fail if millions of
Americans don't pay their mortgages. That's never happened in history.
If you'll forgive me, Dr. Burry, it seems like a foolish investment.
Michael Burry: Well, based on prevailing sentiment, the market, the
banks and popular culture, yes, it's a foolish investment. But, everyone's
wrong.
Goldman Sachs Sales Rep (Lucy): This is Wall Street, Dr. Burry. If you
offer us free money, we ARE going to take it...
Michael Burry: [interrupts her] My one concern is that when the bonds
fail I want to be certain of payment in case of solvency issues with your
bank.
Goldman Sachs Sales Rep (Lucy): I'm sorry, are you for real? You want
to bet against the housing market and you're worried WE won't pay
YOU?
Goldman Sachs Quant (Deeb): [confers, whispering with colleage, in a
lengthy sidebar] Dr. Burry, we could work out a pay-as-we-go structure
that would pay out if the bonds fail. But it would also apply to your
payments if the value of the mortgage bond goes up, You'd have to pay
us monthly premiums.
Goldman Sachs Sales Rep (Lucy): Is that acceptable, Dr. Burry?
Michael Burry: Yes... yes. I have prospectuses on the six mortgagebacked securities I want to short.
Goldman Sachs Quant (Deeb): [Lengthy silence as the Goldman reps scan
and review the thick booklets] Dr. Burry, these should be fine.
Goldman Sachs Sales Rep (Lucy): We're prepared to sell you five million
in credit default swaps on these mortgage bonds.
Michael Burry: Could we make it a hundred million?
Id.
230. See Reiss on Subprime, supra note 77, at 4 (describing the process of
marketing subprime loans to consumers and describes the way predatory
lending grew alongside the extraordinary and rapid expansion of subprime
lending market); see also BIG SHORT, supra note 212 (discussing big bank
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Ultimately, both of the views arrive at a similar conclusion: big
financial conglomerates were responsible for insufficient
underwriting procedures. On one hand, supporters of the
traditional view blame the fraudulent appraisals, whereas its
opponents blame subprime lending.231
b. Degree of Appraisal Accuracy
Big banks, such as Freddie Mac, oppose the use of a traditional
appraisal because; given the extensive subjectivity and ambiguity
inherent in the appraisal process, unscrupulous appraisers can
manipulate this process to reach predetermined property values. 232
Loan originators often exploit the subjective nature of the appraisal
process by exerting pressure on appraisers to deliver predetermined values in order to quickly close on high-volume
mortgage transactions.233 An appraisal value insufficient to support
the desired loan amount may jeopardize the deal and prevent loan
officers and brokers from being paid. 234
Because appraisers rely on loan origination parties for
continuous business, it is inevitable that they will submit to thirdparty pressures by delivering inflated appraisals to meet business
expectations and earn referrals.235 Consequences for parties236 who
submit to such pressures are severe. 237 But it is also easy to mistake
bailouts):
Jared Vennett: “In the years that followed, hundreds of bankers and
rating-agency executives went to jail. The SEC was completely
overhauled, and Congress had no choice but to break up the big banks
and regulate the mortgage and derivative industries. Just kidding!
Banks took the money the American people gave them, and used it to
pay themselves huge bonuses, and lobby the Congress to kill big reform.
And then they blamed immigrants and poor people, and this time even
teaches! And when all was said and done, only one single banker went to
jail this poor schmuck!”
Id.
231. Id. at 4.
232. Murray, supra note 3, at 1309. The accuracy of any appraisal is subject
to number of variables, including the availability and reliability of information.
Id. Even where adequate comparable sales data is available, the data may not
be available. Id. For example, if the sale of a comparable is not a valid arm’s
length transaction. Id. “Consequently, where information is limited or
unreliable, even appraisals prepared by the most competent and conscientious
appraisers are prone to inaccuracy.” Id.
233. Id. at 1313 (discussing borrowers, mortgage-brokers, and lenders as
self-interested parties).
234. Id. at 1314.
235. Id. at 1313.
236. See Wooley, supra note 15, at 360 (giving an example of lenders who
rely upon the value of property to ensure repayment of the loan in the event
that borrower defaults on that loan).
237. Id. at 357 (discussing consequences of lender’s reliance on inaccurate
real estate appraisals).
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appraisal manipulation for an erroneous, but good faith,
assumption that nonetheless can be a valid opinion of value. 238
The degree of appraisal inaccuracy is the primary weakness of
its industry.239 One way to address this weakness is to insulate
appraisers from influence exerted by loan origination parties. 240 By
adopting an independent appraiser assignment system, which
implements a random assignment of appraisers based on their
availability in a specific area, loan origination parties will not have
the opportunity to employ repeat appraisers. 241 A neutral and
independent appraisal system is not a new concept, and the Federal
Housing Administration (“FHA”) used a similar concept called the
“FHA Fee Panel” back in 1994.242
To eliminate the opportunity for self-interested parties to
influence appraisers to deliver predetermined valuations, the
responsibility for selecting appraisers cannot reside with parties
who have incentives to condition future work on the delivery of
favorable appraisals.243 To substantially reduce the likelihood of
this pressure, appraisers must be randomly assigned to perform
collateral valuations.244
However, supporters of automated collateral valuation
238. Murray, supra note 3, at 1311.
239. Wooley, supra note 15, at 357.
240. Murray, supra note 3, at 1306.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1319.
Under that system, homes financed with loans insured by the FHA were
appraised almost exclusively by appraisers assigned from a fee panel
(FHA Fee Panel). Each loan was assigned by the FHA on a rotational
basis to one of approximately 6,000 appraisers on the FHA Fee Panel.
Lenders paid appraisers for completed appraisals and charged the cost
to borrowers. The rotational basis assured appraisers of receiving
regular work. Accordingly, lenders had no power to influence appraisers
with promises or denials of future work. Unfortunately, in 1994, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) implemented
legislation that allowed lenders to choose appraisers in the origination of
single-family home mortgages insured by the FHA. Accordingly, the
FHA established a national roster (FHA Roster) from which lenders
could select appraisers. To assist lenders, the FHA provided an electronic
database tool with which lenders could search for appraisers in their
localities. In 1996, HUD noted that lender-selected appraisers were
performing the vast majority of appraisals and terminated the FHA Fee
Panel. Since then, lenders have selected appraisers from the FHA Roster
to perform all FHA appraisals. In 2008, the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) revised FHA standards for placement on
the FHA Roster. To be eligible for placement on the FHA Roster,
appraisers must be certified in their state of practice and cannot be listed
on any federal sanctions lists.
Id.
243. Id.
244. See id. (discussing methods to reduce external pressures exerted on
appraisers).
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products believe that appraisal accuracy can be better achieved
with new computer technology. Instead of implementing costly
independent assignment systems, the issue of external pressure can
be resolved by eliminating the middleman (i.e. the appraiser), and
utilizing digital tools to automate the process in discrete and logical
steps.245
For example, Freddie Mac uses its Loan Product Advisor
Suite® Software to assess whether a specific property can be eligible
for an appraisal waiver.246 Freddie’s software underwriting tools
screen, identify, validate, confirm, and track loans that are eligible
to receive the automatic collateral evaluation waiver option.247
Freddie says it has sufficient tools in place to ensure that real
property estimates are accurate and without the risk of
compromising integrity of the financial system.248
c.

The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act

Despite criticism that the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”) only
regulates federally insured mortgage transactions, it is nonetheless
the most significant piece of legislation signed into law since the
Great Depression.249 Dodd-Frank brought substantial changes to
the financial sector that affect all federal regulatory agencies,
including real estate appraisers.250 Proponents of Dodd-Frank
argue that its provisions add an additional layer of consumer
protection by incorporating the appraisal independence standard
required by Title XI of FIRREA.251
For example, Dodd-Frank prohibits lenders from making
higher-risk mortgage loans without the support of an independent
real estate appraisal.252 It also provides for civil penalties for
violations of the appraisal independence standard. 253 Dodd-Frank
advocates argue that strict financial regulations enhance the
245. Marshall & Greene, supra note 215, at 1.
246. FREDDIE MAC on ACEs, supra note 8, at 1.
247. Id.
248. See id. (noting –
Zach Dawson, Fannie Mae director of collateral policy, listed several
eligibility criteria for Fannie’s Property Inspection Waiver program.
Some requirements include the purchase loan having 80% or lower loanto-value ratio, being single-family and condo properties, primary
occupancy and second homes and only when Fannie already has a prior
appraisal in electronic format that has been analyzed by Collateral
Underwriter.

1.

Id.
249. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 69 at
250. Id.
251. See id. (discussing generally provisions of Title XI of FIRREA).
252. Boyack, supra note 2, at 971.
253. Id.
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integrity254 of the appraisal process while making the traditional
collateral evaluations more reliable.255 Of course, Dodd-Frank alone
does not warrant against appraiser misconduct, but it is a step in
the right direction.256 It not only protects consumers from mortgage
fraud, but it also keeps big financial conglomerates at bay.257
On the other hand, opponents say that Dodd-Frank regulates
too much.258 Its passage encouraged consolidation of the financial
sector by ensuring that big financial conglomerates survived the
crisis, while it did very little to help community banks.259 Opponents
also criticize Dodd-Frank for its costly regulatory burdens that
threaten community banks, which provide essential services to
small businesses, consumers, and local economies. 260
Republican critics say “the 2010 Dodd-Frank law went too far
and curbs banks’ ability to lend, while many Democrats say it
provides critical protections for consumers and taxpayers.” 261
Although Dodd-Frank has only been in place for nine years, big
banks and their political allies have succeeded to weaken its
regulations.262 They did so by lobbying regulators and suing to
overturn rules, and by pushing the legislature to freeze agency
budgets and repeal Dodd-Frank’s key mandates.263 In 2017, te
254. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that appraisers who perform
appraisals in compliance with USPAP should be able to refute any claims that
their appraisals lack transparence).
The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (“USPAP”)
requires an appraisal report to contain enough information for the
intended users to properly understand the appraisal report. […]
Further, the Conduct section of the ETHICS RULE in USPAP requires
an appraiser to be independent, impartial, and objective, and to
perform assignments without bias.
Id.
255. Id. at 13.
256. Id. at 10.
257. Id.
258. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation is
Needed to Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risk of
Megabanks, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 252 (2015) (discussing criticism of
Dodd-Frank).
259. Id. Federal regulators allowed only one large depository institution
(Washington Mutual) to fail, but they stood by while more than 450 community
banks failed between 2008 and 2012.” Id. Community banks received very little
assistance from the government during the financial crisis. Id.
260. Id.
261. Pete Schroeder & Michelle Price, Senate to Consider Bill Next Week
Easing Banking Regulations, REUTERS, (Mar. 1, 2018) www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-senate-banks/senate-to-consider-bill-next-week-easing-bankrules-idUSKCN1GD667.
262. Mike Konczal, Why Are Democrats Helping Trump Dismantle DoddFrank? N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018) www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/
opinion/democrats-trump-dodd-frank.html.
263. Wilmarth, supra note 258, at 1288.
In addition to trade group’s vigorous lawsuit, the industry’s aggressive
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Senate began considering a bill that would roll back some of the key
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.264
d. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer
Protection Act (“The Crapo Bill”)
In May 2018, President Trump signed into law a bipartisan bill
known as “The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer
Protection Act,” (S.2155)265 which rolls back many post-financialcrisis banking rules that Congress enacted as part of the 2010 DoddFrank law.266 The bill provides a major boost for some of the largest
U.S. banks, and it releases small and medium-sized banks from
tighter regulation by raising the threshold for closer federal
oversight from $50 billion to $250 billion in assets. 267 Banks below
the new threshold will no longer be automatically subject to annual
federal stress test requirements aimed at measuring their ability to
withstand a severe economic downturn.268 By rolling back essential
protections269 of Dodd-Frank, some democrats believe that the
Crapo Bill will open the door to discriminatory lending practices. 270
More importantly, the Crapo Bill rolls back certain appraisal
lobbying efforts have persuaded regulatory agencies to delay or water
down regulation mandated by Dodd-Frank. The industry helped to elect
a Republican majority in the House of Representatives in 2010, and
again in 2012, and Republican leaders have introduced numerous bills
to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act.
Id.
264. Victoria Guida, Crapo Bill State of Play, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2018),
www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-money/2018/03/08/crapo-bill-state-ofplay-125477.
265. Schroeder & Price, supra note 261. The Crapo bill is unusual in today’s
hyperpartisan environment: It has over 10 Democratic co-sponsors, many from
swing or red states and up for re-election this year. Id.
266. Sylvan Lane, Trump Signs Dodd-Frank Rollback, HILL (May 24, 2018),
www.thehill.com/policy/finance/389212-trump-signs-dodd-frank-rollback.
267. Id.
268. Alan Rappeport & Emily Flitter, Congress Approves First Bib DoddFrank Rollback, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/22/business/congress-passes-dodd-frank-rollback-for-smallerbanks.html. The bill also exempts some loan originators (including small
lenders) from certain disclosure requirements under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act. Id. Democrats say this will open the door to discriminatory
lending practices because the rules required collection of credit scores, loan
amounts and interest rates in an effort to expose redlining and lending
discrimination. Id.
269. See Gelzinis & Valenti, supra note 223, at 1 (discussing how the bill
also eliminates escrow requirements for higher-cost mortgages made by banks
and credit unions with assets of up to $10 billion, up from $2 billion currently).
Escrow is an essential borrower protection; an arrangement that prominently
identifies the full cost of a mortgage loan for a prospective homebuyer. Id. It
also prevents the likelihood of losing a home due to an unpaid tax lien or
subjection to expensive force-placed insurance. Id.
270. Id.
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requirements for higher-risk mortgages in rural areas.271 It allows
lenders “to bypass appraisals for any property with a transaction
value of $400,000 or less” (increasing the de minimus threshold) if
the lender is “unable to find an available appraiser to complete an
appraisal within a reasonable amount of time.” 272
Opponents273 of the Crapo Bill argue that it threatens the
future profession of rural appraisers, and that banks will
inappropriately use the law’s provisions to avoid fundamental risk
management functions.274 The bill also ignores causes of the 2010

271. House Passes Dodd-Frank Reform Bill Complete With Appraisal
Revisions,
APPRAISAL
INSTITUTE
(May
28,
2018)
www.appraisalinstitute.org/ano/house-passes-dodd-frank-reform-bill-completewith-appraisal-revisions-/; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.35(b)(2)(iii)(A) (2019)
(noting the requirements for higher-priced mortgage loans and defining “rural
as follows:
(A) An area is “rural” during a calendar year if it is:
(1) A county that is neither in a metropolitan statistical area nor in a
micropolitan statistical area that is adjacent to a metropolitan statistical
area, as those terms are defined by the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget and as they are applied under currently applicable Urban
Influence Codes (UICs), established by the United States Department of
Agriculture's Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS);
(2) A census block that is not in an urban area, as defined by the U.S.
Census Bureau using the latest decennial census of the United States;
or
(3) A county or a census block that has been designated as rural by the
Bureau pursuant to the application process established under section
89002 of the Helping Expand Lending Practices in Rural Communities
Act, Public Law 114-94, title LXXXIX (2015). The provisions of this
paragraph (b)(2)(iv)(A)(3) shall cease to have any force or effect on
December 4, 2017.
Id.
272. Dave Towne, Dangerous Pending Bill in US Senate, APPRAISER BLOGS
(Feb. 9, 2018), www.appraiserblogs.com/pending-bill-threatening-rural-areasappraisers.
273. Caroline Basile, House Passes Dodd-Frank Reform Bill, Approval Now
Pending From President Trump, HOUSING WIRE (May 22, 2018),
www.housingwire.com/articles/43443-house-passes-dodd-frank-reform-billapproval-now-pending-from-president-trump. Opponents of the bill strongly
cautioned against the bill’s passage prior to the vote. Id. Rep. Maxine Waters,
D-Calif., vehemently opposed the bill and voiced her opposition to the bill on the
floor of the House:
Republicans are trying to pass this bill off as an effort solely designed to
benefit small community banks. But the truth is the bill is packed with
poisonous provisions that benefit megabanks like Wells Fargo and
companies like Equifax. It also weakens critical mortgage protections to
ensure borrowers can afford their loans, and prevent discrimination and
fraud.
Id.
274. Coalition Letter, APPRAISAL INSTITUTE (Mar. 13, 2018), www.app
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financial crisis and instead of narrowly tailoring rules to address
specific concerns in the marketplace; it creates massive new risks
in the housing market.275 While opponents of the Crapo Bill argue
that it is extraordinarily dangerous for the economy to loosen up
financial regulations, its proponents believe that it will stimulate
and promote economic growth.276
Republican lawmakers and the banking industry contend that
the Crapo Bill will “help unshackle banks — and the economy —
from regulatory burdens,” put in place after the Great Recession.277
Proponents of the bill believe that it will stimulate and promote
economic growth by relieving small banks from strict financial
raisalinstitute.org/assets/1/29/Coalition_letter_-_Final.pdf. For example, by
attempting to contract with out of market appraisers, or presenting
unreasonable or below market assignment conditions or requests. Id. Although
the Bill requires compliance with the appraiser independence standard and
mandates that appraisals be furnished “within a reasonable time,” the risk of
big banks using this to bypass risk management requirements is too great. Id.
Opponents contend that the risk of this exemption will only foster dangerous
mortgage practices because reducing appraisal requirements will only increase
risks to the taxpayers, who stand behind FDIC-insured institutions. Id.
275. Gelzinis & Valenti, supra note 223, at 1. The bill is applicable to
primarily residential loans held in portfolio where the loans generally are
prohibited from being sold or transferred. Id. Nonetheless, opponents of the
Crapo Bill say that it will weaken the oversight needed to monitor and
discourage dangerous lending and investing the U.S. economy to its “knees a
decade ago.” Id. The bill makes the U.S. financial system – and key regional
economies – more vulnerable to another financial crisis, potentially putting
taxpayers back on the hook to bail out the same banks once again. Id.
276. Id.; Schroeder & Price, supra note 261; see also APPRAISAL INSTITUTE
on Dodd-Frank, supra note 271, at 1 (noting as follows—
The Appraisal Institute took no position on the bill, which the Senate
approved in March, but endorsed changes to appraisal exemptions
included in the measure. The bill clarifies that a bank must engage at
least three appraisers on the bank’s approved appraiser list, in the local
market area and in compliance with existing appraiser independence
requirements. It also establishes a reasonable timeliness standard.)
Id.; see also Coalition Letter, supra note 274, at 1 (agreeing that provisions
of the Crapo Bill will ensure that banks made a good faith effort to place the
appraisal with local market appraisers, consistent with the bill’s intent).
“However, without further clarifying provisions, we believe the provision could
be used inappropriately by banks to avoid fundamental risk management
requirements altogether, for example, by attempting to contract with out of
market appraisers, or presenting unreasonable or below market assignment
conditions or requests.” Id.
277. Rappeport & Flitter, supra note 268, at 1. Paul D. Ryan, the House
Speaker and Wisconsin Republican, said the bill’s passage was a step toward
“freeing our economy from overregulation.” “Our smaller banks are engines of
growth,” he said in a statement. “By lending to small businesses and offering
banking services for consumers, these institutions are and will remain vital for
millions of Americans who participate in our economy.” Id. “Republicans, and
some Democrats, say that the Dodd-Frank law has unnecessarily hurt smalland-medium-sized banks that did not play a role in the financial crisis and
which as a result, have cut off the flow of credit to many Americans.” Id.
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regulations and thus, encouraging credit lending.278 But, more must
be done to fix the regulatory overreach created by the crisis. 279
Because the Crapo Bill was just signed into law earlier this year, it
is unclear how it will be applied to residential mortgage transaction.

B. Freddie Mac Says that Automatic Collateral
Evaluation Products Make Mortgages Affordable
and Efficient
Big banks such as Freddie Mac, and other financial institution
oppose the use of traditional appraisals for several reasons. First,
they want to utilize different or additional analytics to evaluate
collateral in light of innovative technology.280 Second, they want to
eliminate the traditional appraisal to shorten the mortgage
underwriting process.281 Third, they want to reduce borrower’s loan
origination cost282 by eliminating the cost of a traditional
appraisal.283 Additionally, Freddie Mac says that traditional
appraisals yield unreliable estimates of value due to the subjective
nature of the valuation process. 284
Without doubt, Freddie Mac is the leading proponent of the
Automated Collateral Evaluations (“ACE”) and it encourages loan
origination parties to utilize its innovative underwriting tools on its
website.285 These tools enable mortgage brokers to assess whether
a traditional appraisal is required for a specific type 286 of real
property that has a federally insured loan.287 In fact, Freddie Mac
announced a new program effective September 1, 2017 that helps
residential buyers in certain states lower the loan origination fees
by removing the appraisal requirement.288
David Lowman, Freddie Mac’s executive vice president of
single-family business says, “[b]y leveraging big data and advanced

278. Schroeder & Price, supra note 261, at 1. Supporters of the Crapo Bill
argue that it brings needed relief to small and regional banks, which they say
were treated unfairly during the financial reform of 2010. Id.
279. Id.
280. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 31 (discussing reasons for Freddie Mac’s
increased use of automatic collateral evaluation products).
281. Id. at 13.
282. See id. (providing one example in the default mortgage-servicing
sector). Clients often require valuations for each asset several times a year. Id.
Many of these clients feel the opinion of value may not be as important as the
data presented; as a result, the cost of acquiring appraisals on a property
several times each year is considered cost-prohibitive. Id.
283. Id.
284. Tibbitts, supra note 194, at 1.
285. Id.
286. See id. (giving an example of an exception where the use of a traditional
real estate appraisal may be required is new construction homes).
287. Id.
288. USPAP, supra note 28 at 4.
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analytics, as well as 40-plus years of historical data, we’re cutting
costs and speeding up the closing process for borrowers.” 289 Freddie
also says that it is “reimagining” the mortgage process to create a
better experience for consumers and lenders by providing
immediate collateral representation and warranty relief to lenders,
saving buyers loan origination fees of approximately $500, and
speeding up the closing up to ten days sooner.290
To determine whether a loan is eligible for an automated
collateral evaluation, mortgage brokers working with consumers
who are buying homes or refinancing their existing Freddie Mac
mortgages must submit the loan through Freddie Mac’s website. 291
Freddie Mac went even a step further and designed the “Loan
Advisor Suite,”292 which it claims will enhance “the mortgage
lending process by utilizing advanced analytic tools” to efficiently
come up with an estimated property value and determine buyer’s
creditworthiness.293 The innovative mortgage underwriting
techniques encourage other big banks to save time and costs by
converting to the use of ACEs and other automatic loan processing
tools.294
Proponents of the ACEs argue that eliminating the use of
traditional appraisals will make mortgage underwriting more
accessible295 (by helping buyers save on loan costs) and more
efficient (by eliminating tools that prolong the credit approval
process).296 Because clients utilize ACEs for different needs with
varying degree of data, Freddie believes this new trend will
eliminate economic waste and preserve resources.297 Appraisal
alternatives have been on the market for decades and their use is

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See Tibbitts, supra note 194, at 1 (discussing Freddie’s procedures for
loan eligibility for automatic collateral evaluations).
292. Freddie Mac Loan Advisor Suite, FREDDIE MAC (last visited on April
22, 2019), www.freddiemac.com/loanadvisorsuite
Freddie is building tools to help mortgage professionals cut costs in the
underwriting process, by also giving them representation and warranty
relief sooner in the loan manufacturing process by utilizing the use of
automated collateral evaluation, automated assessments for borrowers
without credit scores, immediate certainty for collateral rep and
warranty relief, and coming soon automated asset and income
validation.
Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See Harney, infra note 302, (stating, “Consumers definitely appreciate
it," he added. There's "more cash in their pockets" and the total experience is
better.”)
296. See id. (arguing that elimination of a traditional appraisal will lower
borrower’s loan costs and discussing other advantages of using ACEs).
297. Light, supra note 185.
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expected to grow in the future.298 For example, the Broker Price
Opinions (“BPOs”)299 and the Comparative Market Analysis
(“CMAs”)300 are a less costly alternative to help buyers, sellers, and
lenders quickly determine property values.301 Mortgage lenders are
also enthusiastic about this move because ACEs will simplify the
mortgage origination process.302
While opponents of ACEs do not condemn the use of innovative
technology in the mortgage field, they nonetheless caution against
the use of ACEs to determine fair market value of real properties in

298. See USPAP, supra note 28 at 4 (explaining, [a]lthough it may be
difficult to verify, some estimate that over 12 million BPOs 182 are
performed annually. […] These alternate collateral products also include
Broker Price Opinions (BPOs) typically in short sales, Comparative
Market Analysis (CMAs) for determining the fair market value, and
Automated Valuation Products (AVPs) which are used by Freddie Mac
in lieu of a traditional appraisal, Appraiser Price Opinions (APOs),
Reconciliation Review, Non-Standard Desktop Valuations/Field Review,
and Full Inspection Proprietary Appraisal Forms.)
Id. at 4.
299. See id. at 4 (noting that
BPOs are one of the most commonly-recognized AVPs. Id. In addition,
BPOs have been used for many years by real estate brokers in the
ordinary course of their real estate brokerage businesses, with over 12
BPOs preformed annually. Id. The product was originally designed to
assist homebuyers and sellers in real estate listing and sale transactions,
but in recent years its use has been expanded for additional purposes.
Id. Freddie Mac has developed sample BPO forms, and they have been
used in residential sales, appraisals, internal non-lending purposes,
secondary loan markets, distressed loans, and other legal purposes such
as foreclosure or a divorce).
Id. at 4.
300. Id. at 4.
Comparative Market Analysis “CMA” is a product, which originally was
used in a very similar fashion to BPOs, but mostly real estate brokers
use it. Like BPOs, CMAs may also include information regarding closed
and pending sales, as well as active listings in the area to assist buyers
and sellers to determine a fair market value of the subject property.
Id.
301. Id.
302. Kenneth Harney, Are Home Appraisals Always Necessary? CHI. TRIB.
(June 20, 2017), www.chicagotribune.com/classified/realestate/ct-re-0625kenneth-harney-20170621-column.html.
For example, Dave Norris, chief revenue officer of loanDepot, one of the
highest-volume retail lenders in the country, said "leveraging
technology" to arrive at property valuations "gives consumers certainty"
about the status of their application upfront, sharply reduces the time
needed to get to closing and saves money. Roughly 12 percent of
loanDepot's refinancing through Fannie Mae already is proceeding
appraisal-free, Norris said.
Id.
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residential mortgage transactions. 303 Although technology
advancements help appraisers obtain valuations more efficiently,
the use of ACEs still carries risks that undermine the integrity of
the financial system.304
Appraisers must be able to control the valuation process by
selecting and inputting information in the reports based on their
personal knowledge and experience in the field.305 If appraisers
allow software or tools to control the valuation process, the output
may be less credible with unreliable or misleading property
valuations.306 Instead of solely relying on technology, appraisers
should control the valuation process by selecting data, engaging in
parameter analysis, and interpreting the output.307 ACE opponents
believe that eliminating a traditional appraisal is a flashback to the
“disastrous practices of subprime lenders during the housing boom
and bust.”308
While the use of ACEs sparks a lot of concerns in the mortgage
field, big banks such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will likely
continue to innovate and dominate the market in this area. 309 These
financial conglomerates are “very committed to driving responsible
innovation in the collateral space and trying to modernize the
mortgage origination process.”310 In this field, it is vital to keep up
with the latest technology trends. 311 Ultimately, utilizing ACEs will
not only speed up the mortgage underwriting process but it will also
reduce borrowers’ loan origination costs, making mortgages more
accessible to residential purchasers.

303. Marty Hamilton, Advisory Opinion 37 – Computer Assisted Valuation
Tools, DATA MASTER FOR APPRAISERS (Nov. 27, 2017), www.data
masterusa.com/advisory-opinion-37
304. Id. In fact, opponents argue that a valuation method that does not
provide a property’s market value or sufficient information and analysis to
support the value conclusion is not acceptable as an evaluation. Id.; see also 4A
DENNIS A. SCARDILLI, REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 2H.44 (2018) (giving an
example of a valuation method that provides a sales or list price, such as a
broker price opinion, cannot be used as an evaluation because, among other
things, it does not provide a property’s market value).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Harney, supra note 302. When interviewed about this issue, a
Richmond, Va., appraiser, said: “I've walked into 5-year-old houses that are in
such bad shape that they look like they haven't been maintained for 25 years.”
Id. “This is a return to no doc and low doc on steroids.” Id.
309. Ramirez, supra note 10, at 1.
310. Id.
311. See USPAP, supra note 28 at 10 (noting that proponents of the use of
automatic collateral evaluations value innovative technological trends).
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C. Opposition to Automatic Collateral Evaluation
Products
While Freddie’s innovative appraisal alternative looks very
promising; its opponents argue that it is a recipe for a disaster for
three reasons. First, automated evaluation products are inaccurate
and unreliable. Second, because the mortgage market is cyclical,
allowing the use of ACEs will frustrate Congress’ efforts to protect
consumers against mortgage fraud. Third, it is likely that ACEs do
not comply with USPAP standards.
1. ACEs Are Inaccurate and Unreliable
There are two competing views on the use of ACEs in
residential mortgage transactions. One of the biggest drawbacks is
a computer’s inability to accurately evaluate the physical condition
of real property, which affects its fair market value. 312 Because
ACEs rely on a previously computer-generated market data, their
software313 is unable to accurately evaluate land and its
improvements.314 The valuation estimate assumes the average
condition of real property based on information generated from
various computer sources.315 But without considering physical
aspects of real property (i.e. evaluating its upgrades, fixtures,
amenities, repairs, or damages), the valuation estimate will be at a
substantial risk for inflation.316 Inflation will ultimately fuel rapid
and unsustainable growth in the housing market, yet creating
another mortgage bubble.317
Undeniably, ACEs are typically less reliable for properties in
markets that include new construction or uniquely renovated homes
with custom features, varying levels of construction, rare amenities,
etc., or homes in areas with relatively little market activity. 318 The
uniqueness of a real estate parcel may render its fair market value
312. Id.
313. 1 JEFFREY TORP, RISK-BASED COMPLIANCE AUDIT PROGRAM § 6D.10
(2018). A computer program estimates a property’s market value based on
market, economic, and demographic factors that were previously generated by
other sources and published online. Id.
314. Light, supra note 185, at 1 (noting counterarguments to the use of
automatic collateral evaluations); see also USPAP, supra note 28, at 10 (noting
that improvements include, but are not limited to: exterior amenities, total room
count, condition and age of home’s systems, unappealing features,
improvements and condition of kitchen, baths, roof, windows, heating,
electrical, plumbing, and so forth).
315. John Reilly, Using MLS Data to Generate an AVM, DATA ADVOCATE
(May 29, 2014), www.thedataadvocate.com/using-mls-data-to-generate-anavm/.
316. Murray, supra note 3, at 1305.
317. Id.
318. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 9 (discussing reliability of automated
collateral evaluation products).
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grossly disproportionate, if the lender (e.g. Freddie Mac 319) relies on
a computer-generated valuation that disregards its unique physical
aspect.320
On the other hand, proponents argue that ACEs are especially
reliable if real property is located within a homogenous
marketplace.321 But, that is not always the case. An issue arises
when the MLS system utilized by real estate brokers contains
outdated property information. 322 Usually, this happens if a
property has been sitting on the market for a while or when the
listing expires.323 If a particular real property is later re-listed, real
estate brokers often fail to update and verify its information. 324 Too
often, the MLS data is simply erroneous and not up-to-date, with
property addresses that do not even exist.325

319. Compliance Audit Program, supra note 313, at 1 (discussing that
opponents of ACEs argue that such,
Institutions should establish policies and procedures that govern the use
of AVMs and specify the supplemental information that is required to
develop an evaluation. When the supplemental information indicates the
AVM is not an acceptable valuation tool, the institution’s policies and
procedures should require the use of an alternative method or tool.
Id.
320. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 10 (presenting opponents’ view on the
use of automatic collateral evaluation products).
321. Id. The computer system analyzes hundreds of sales of very similar
properties that render a reliable estimate of value. Id.
322. See Jeanne Sager, Expired Listing vs. Withdrawn Listing: What is the
Difference? REALTOR.COM (Sept. 28, 2017), www.realtor.com/advice/sell/whatis-the-difference-between-a-withdrawn-listing-and-an-expired-one/.
323. See id. (defining expired listing as a property that has not sold by the
end of the period stipulated in the listing contract between the seller and the
listing agent).
324. Id. For example, MLS listing sheets operated by real estate brokers
often contains information with outdated property taxes, homeowner’s
assessment dues, amenities, or even square footage. Id. Consequently, online
syndication websites such as Zillow.com, or Trulia.com obtain property
information from a variety of unreliable sources, which are used too quickly to
determine a property’s fair market value; see also Zillow Talk: What You Might
Not Know About Online Syndicators, MODBOULDER (Sept. 18, 2015),
www.modboulder.com/blogs/2015/9/17/zillow-talk-what-you-might-not-knowabout-online-real-estate-syndicators (describing Zillow as a syndicator and
explaining that it grabs information from a variety of online sources, not just
your local Multi Listing Service (MLS), which may not be accurate or up to date);
see also Illinois Bar Journal, Class Action: Zillow “Zestimate” an Unlicensed
Appraisal?
ILLINOIS
STATE
BAR
ASSOCIATION
(July
2017),
www.isba.org/ibj/2017/07. Zillow.com is a website that allows users to search for
properties listed for sale and look up the estimated value of a property (even if
it is not for sale). This value is Zillow's "Zestimate," a number generated by a
computer algorithm. Zestimates are often used to quickly determine a home's
approximate value. Id. Too often this data is simply erroneous and not-up-todate, with property addresses that don’t exist. Id.
325. See MODBOULDER, supra note 324 (discussing common issues with
estimates generated by Zillow.Com and Trulia.Com).
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But with proper internal validation procedures, proponents
believe ACEs can yield reliable and accurate results.326 For
example, a financial institution can establish internal procedures to
monitor automatic valuations.327 “Validation can be performed
internally or with the assistance of a third party, as long as the
validation is “conducted by qualified individuals that are
independent of the model development or sales functions.” 328
Ultimately, the goal is to make the mortgage origination process
more efficient and reliable.329 Proponents believe that ACEs can
achieve this goal without compromising the integrity of the
financial system.330
But opponents condemn the use of ACEs in residential
mortgage transactions because they believe ACEs violate the
USPAP standards.331 To illustrate, many unlicensed appraises
already perform a number of ACEs assignments for mortgage
transactions without the necessary education or experience. 332 Even
internal validation procedures will not make up for an appraiser’s
knowledge and experience, or his physical inspection of real
property.333 While ACEs may prove to be cost effective and time
efficient, their use raises serious implications about consumer
protection.334
2. ACEs Disrupt Consumer Protections
Consumer protection groups oppose the use of ACEs in
mortgage transactions because the real estate market is cyclical.335
Housing markets are prone to booms accompanied by bubbles in
mortgage credit.336 Mortgage bubbles are created when lenders cut
underwriting standards, producing a surfeit of bad loans, which

326. 1-11 Mortgage Procedure Guide to Federal and State Compliance §
11.41 (2017).
327. Id. A financial institution must demonstrate that the “depth and extent
of its validation processes are consistent with the materiality of the risk and the
complexity of the transaction.” Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 373 (noting that ACEs
undermine integrity of the mortgage process).
331. See Russell, supra note 25, at 14-15 (discussing complications of using
ACEs in residential mortgage transactions).
332. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 13 (discussing non-licensed individuals
preforming real property evaluations).
333. Mortgage Procedure Guide, supra note 326, at 1. An institution should
not rely solely on validation representations provided by an AVM vendor. Id.
334. See generally Wooley, supra note 15, at 1118 (discussing risks
associated with the use of ACEs).
335. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 361 (defining cyclicality as
the propensity of housing markets to undergo bubbles in which real estate
values soar, then crash, wiping out home equity).
336. Id.
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lead to elevated loan defaults.337 The mortgage origination market
understands that bad underwriting procedures and appraisal
inflation were among the leading causes of the 2007-2009 financial
collapse.338
Appraisals are essential to mortgage lending but they are also
cyclical in nature (i.e. they are based on comparable sales that are
market-dependent).339 This is true for both ACEs and traditional
appraisals, because they rely on comps derived from recent sales in
a particular neighborhood. 340 Because the real estate market is
cyclical, opponents say that ACEs frustrate procedural safeguards
put in place after the Great Recession, which are keeping big banks
at bay.341
3. ACEs Do Not Comply With USPAP Standards
Lastly, opponents believe that ACEs do not comply with
USPAP standards implemented after the Great Recession.342 For
example, ACEs lack the traditional development and reporting
requirements under USPAP.343 The Appraisal Standards Board
(“ASB”) does not deem any automated valuation product as USPAPcompliant because, this responsibility rests with the appraiser. 344
Many states require their licensed appraisers to comply with
USPAP for all opinions of value, not just those required by Title XI
of FIRREA.345 In fact, they allow appraisers to perform an
“alternate valuation product” only if the result is USPAPcompliant.346 But do to the inherent risk of inflation ACEs should
not be used in residential mortgage transactions.347
4. Compare and Contrast ACEs with the Traditional
Residential Appraisal
One of the most significant differences between these two
approaches is the method by which the property valuation is

337. Id.
338. Id. at 372.
339. Id. at 373.
340. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 9 (defining recent as typically within the
last six months).
341. McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 373. In addition, opponents of
ACEs argue that their use will also undermine the integrity of mortgage lending
process by producing grossly inaccurate property values. Id.
342. USPAP, supra note 28, at 9.
343. Id.
344. Id. To be in compliance, a residential appraisal report must use a
Summary Appraisal Report, or a Restricted Appraisal Report. Id. (discussing
differences between these two appraisal reports).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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procured.348 Freddie Mac and its supporters argue that using ACEs
will make housing more accessible and affordable.349 Lowering
borrowers’ loan origination costs will also speed up the closing (up
to ten days sooner) making the homeownership dream a reality.350
Proponents argue that increased scrutiny after the Great Recession
has “improved the industry’s risk assessment and management
abilities overall and, accordingly, have decreased the expected
default rate on all mortgages.”351
But lessening underwriting standards and eliminating the use
of a traditional appraisal may have devastating impacts on the
housing market in the near future.352 A traditional appraisal is
essential to home mortgage lending because it serves as the most
important predictor of default, and it utilizes an appraiser’s
education and experience in generating the fair market value of real
property.353 If lenders rely on inaccurate or inflated appraisals to
provide loans, which insufficiently secure the actual collateral
values, the real estate market is heading towards another crash. 354
Nevertheless, both systems (ACEs and traditional appraisals)
are at risk of producing inaccurate property valuations, either due
to a human error or a computer error.355 The problem of valuation
disparities is problematic because the real estate market is cyclical
and it is prone to frequent “market booms.”356 When the real estate
market is booming, lenders quickly expand credit without a regard
for many underwriting requirements.357 “Subsequently, when
property values slump and loan defaults spike, the ensuing losses
jeopardize the solvency of banks, “leaving bank failures in their
wake.”358 It does not matter which appraisal technique the lender
348. See Tibbitts, supra note 194, at 1 (discussing different methods of
procuring property valuations).
349. See id. (proposing arguments in favor of ACEs because they remove
outdated and unnecessary procedures that prolong the mortgage underwriting
process).
350. Id.
351. Goodman & Zhu, supra note 195, at 1. In fact, ACEs “have enabled
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to share concerns with lenders about an appraisal
prior to execution of a mortgage, allowing the lender to take corrective action.
Id. It was predicted that these developments would decrease the expected
default rate on all refinanced mortgages, which were particularly susceptible to
appraisal fraud. Id. The data reveals that this has indeed been the case. Id.
352. McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 372.
353. Id. at 373.
354. Murray, supra note 3, at 1303. In 1985, the portfolios of more than eight
hundred federally insured the portfolios of more than eight hundred federally
insured lending institutions contained under-secured loans supported by real
estate appraisals that overvalued collateral properties by an aggregate of $3
billion. Id.
355. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 364 (discussing risks of
procuring unreliable appraisals).
356. See id. at 365 (noting that the real estate market is cyclical).
357. Id. at 373.
358. Id. at 365.
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used, so long as it resulted in an inflated appraisals that did not
adequately secure the actual collateral value.359 The end result will
be the same: the economy will suffer from the consequences of
carless mortgage lending.

IV. PROPOSAL
While there is no easy fix to the procyclical effect of mortgage
appraisals, current regulatory gaps require significant reform. 360
Undisputedly, consumer protection advocates regard Congress’
efforts to encourage transparency in the financial sector as a step in
right direction. But current protections of the Dodd-Frank Act are
simply not enough for four reasons. First, Dodd-Frank is too far
removed from the transactions on the state level. Second, until the
legislature substantially reduces the opportunity for self-interested
parties to exert pressures on appraisers in residential transactions,
the integrity of the process will be compromised. Third, Congress
has been inactive in the appraisal field for almost nine years and it
is now the time to set clear appraisal standards. Fourth, Congress
should repeal the Crapo Bill as it invites lenders to engage in
dangerous mortgage lending practices.

A. Congress Should Extend Provisions of the DoddFrank Act to All Residential Mortgage Transactions
Because provisions of Dodd-Frank inadequately address the
underlying asset valuation problem,361 Congress should respond by
amending provisions of the Act to require lenders to adhere to the
independent appraisal standard in every residential mortgage
transaction. As it stands, Dodd-Frank is too remote with respect to
governing state transactions because it does not apply to nonfederal loans.362 It only affords a system of federal regulatory control
over very large financial institutions.363 Lenders who are not
federally regulated are not required to adhere to statutory appraisal
regulations.364
This regulatory oversight allows smaller lenders, such as
community banks or secondary market lenders (i.e. Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae) to engage in deceptive lending practices, which
may rely on the use fraudulent appraisals. Congress should
incorporate the independent appraisal standard to every residential
mortgage transaction to preserve the integrity of the financial

359. Murray, supra note 3, at 1303.
360. McCoy & Wachter, supra note 122, at 387.
361. Boyack, supra note 2, at 962.
362. Id. at 968.
363. Id.
364. USPAP , supra note 28, at 6.
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system. It can do so by either amending provisions of the DoddFrank act or passing new legislation.
1. Congress Should Incorporate the Independent Appraisal
Standard to All Residential Mortgage Transactions.
The independent appraisal standard should be incorporated
into every residential mortgage transaction (whether the loan is
federally insured or not). That is, every lender or banking
institution should explicitly prohibit appraisers from engaging in
any types of coercive communication.
Currently, Dodd-Frank only requires lenders to adhere to this
standard when they are funding higher-risk federal mortgage
loans.365 But it is not enough to regulate the use of only highly risky
loan products, such as higher-priced mortgage loans (“HPMLs”).366
To fill the regulatory gap, the appraisal independence standard
must be utilized in every mortgage transaction, including, but not
limited to, home purchases, refinances, or home equity loans. This
step is critical to the health of the mortgage industry because it is
essential in calculating lender’s risk if the borrower defaults on a
mortgage loan.367 It is not enough to impose the statutory
independence requirement only on highly risky loan products.
Without extending provisions of Dodd-Frank to all mortgage
transactions, the regulatory oversight gap on the state and federal
level will never be properly addressed. It should be noted that this
proposal does not violate the anti-commandeering368 doctrine
365. Boyack, supra note 2, at 967.
366. See generally, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 30
(discussing HPMLs as risky mortgages).
367. See generally, Boyack, supra note 2, at 967 (outlining critical steps to
ensure healthy mortgage market).
368. Steven Schwinn, Symposium: It’s time to abandon anti-commandeering
(But Don’t Count on The Supreme Court To Do It) SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2017)
www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-time-abandon-anti-commandeeringdont-count-supreme-court/. The anti-commandeering doctrine says that the
federal government cannot require states or state officials to adopt or enforce
federal law. Id. The Supreme Court created this doctrine out of the 10th
Amendment and related federalism principles in two cases, New York v. United
States (1992), and Printz v. United States (1997), 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997)
(holding that the federal government cannot force the states to act against their
will by withholding funds in a coercive manner); see also Independent Business
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 519 (2012) (holding that the federal government
cannot compel states to expand Medicaid by threatening to withhold funding for
Medicaid programs already in place.); see also New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149 (1922) (holding that “because the Act’s take title provision offers
the States a ‘choice’ between the two unconstitutionally coercive alternatives–
either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to Congress’
instructions–the provision lies outside Congress’ enumerated powers and is
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.”) But the United States has a dual
banking system that specifically allows Congress to regulate in the field of the
financial sector. Schwinn, supra.
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because the United States has a dual banking system that
specifically allows Congress to regulate in the financial sector. 369
The banking industry has been largely removed from states’
regulation by federal preemption.370 There are very few banks in the
category of state-chartered banks, because lack of federal deposit
insurance is a major competitive disadvantage.371 Although
consumer protection is an essential part of states’ police powers, the
preemption doctrine372 is presumed to have foreclosed the
meaningful state regulation of federally chartered financial
institutions.373
369. Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets
Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143 (2009)
Meaning that banks may be chartered by either the federal government
or a state government. Regulatory authority over banks for consumer
protection depends on whether a bank has a federal or state charter,
what type of charter the bank has, whether the bank has federal deposit
insurance, whether the bank is a member of the Federal Reserve system,
what activity is involved (real-estate lending or non-real-estate lending,
for example), and whether the consumer-protection issue arises in
advertising and solicitation.
Id. at 149.
370.
States cannot directly regulate federally chartered banks, thrifts, or
credit unions, their operating subsidiaries, or even some of their agents
beyond subjecting them to "state laws of general application … to the
extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes"
of federal banking law. Instead, consumer-protection regulation of
federally chartered financial institutions has become the preserve of a
dispersed group of federal agencies. This arrangement is made more
problematic by the fact that preempted state consumer-protection
regulations have often not been replaced by equivalent federal
protections, and federal enforcement of existing regulations has been lax.
For much of the consumer financial product market, the preemption
experience has effectively been a deregulation experience.
Id.
371. Levitin, supra note 369, at 149. “If a bank has a state charter and is
neither federally insured nor a member of the Federal Reserve System, its
primary regulator for consumer protection will be the state banking regulator
and/or state attorney general. Non-member insured state-chartered banks are
regulated by the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation.” For example,
State-chartered member banks are regulated by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve. Id.
372. Schwinn, supra note 368. The preemption doctrine, which derives from
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, makes the Constitution and federal
laws supreme over state constitutions and state laws; it also binds state judges
to the Constitution and federal law. Id. The oath clause requires state
legislators and state executive officers to swear an oath to support the federal
Constitution. Id.
373. Id. However, states possess a major, untapped regulatory tool:
the regulation of secondary-market purchasers of consumer debt from
federally chartered financial institutions. Id. Preemption doctrine prevents
only direct state regulation of federally chartered financial institutions. Id. It
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2. Congress Should Promote Responsible Lending Behavior
Through Increased Federal Incentives
Another unintended consequence of Dodd-Frank is the fact
that some states do not have mandatory appraiser licensing
requirements.374 This means that in those states, a license or
certification is not required to conduct a real estate appraisal.375 For
those who wish to perform an appraisal in a federally regulated
transaction, the appraiser can choose to become certified/licensed
and submit to the State’s regulatory jurisdiction.376 This gives
lenders a lot of leverage in how they allocate their loan products,
and there is no way to ensure that they comply with the
independent appraisal standard.
But to encourage the appraiser licensing agencies to comply
with provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Appraisal Subcommittee
(“ASC”) allows for certain monetary incentives to participating
states.377 However, these monetary incentives are simply not
enough. First, they only apply to all federally regulated mortgage
transactions. Second, even with these incentives in place, some
states still do not have mandatory appraiser licensing
requirements.378 Today, only a handful of states have voluntary 379
licensing requirement and only thirteen states have mandatory
licensing requirements but for federally related transactions
only.380 There are two solutions to this problem.
First, Congress should increase its incentives for states to
impose mandatory licensing requirements on all appraisers for all
federally related transactions. In part, this will ensure that newly

does not prevent states from regulating secondary-market purchasers of debt
from federally chartered financial institutions. Id.
374. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 69,
at 1 (containing information regarding state licensing requirements).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Russell, supra note 25, at 9.
378. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 69, at
1.
379. See id. (stating that the following states have voluntary licensing
requirements: Alaska, Wyoming, and Oklahoma).
380. See id. (defining “voluntary” by stating that,
Certified/licensed
appraisers
are
not
required
for
any
appraisal/evaluation assignments. If appraisers wish to perform
appraisals in such federally related transactions and real estate related
transactions, appraisers can choose to become certified/licensed and
submit to the State's regulatory jurisdiction” […]. “Explaining that
appraisal is required in any federally related transactions and real estate
related financial transactions when Federal law requires the services of
such appraisers).
Id.
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licensed appraisers have sufficient knowledge and qualifications to
produce a credible opinion of value. 381 The USPAP teaches new
appraisers the importance of adhering to ethical performance in
real estate evaluations, which is so essential to every mortgage
transaction.382 Although the risk of fraudulent appraisals will never
be entirely eliminated, increasing federal grants to state
participants will substantially encourage ethical performance
across all states. Therefore, Congress should encourage all states to
take advantage of the federal grants by amending provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act to offer better incentives to participating states.
3. Mandatory-Licensing Rules Should Apply to All States
Second, lack of consistency in state licensing requirements
leaves consumers vulnerable to comparability and reliability
issues.383 Another issue associated with transparency in licensing
requirements is the lack of disclosure about the components covered
by appraisal fees, such as lenders fees, fees paid to the appraisal
management companies (“ACMs”) and appraisal fees.384 Congress
should amend provisions of Dodd-Frank to impose mandatory
licensing requirements in all states. The states should be required
to use a licensed appraiser for any evaluation service for which real
property is used as collateral for the mortgage loan. 385 Consistency
in appraisal requirements in all states would not only improve
comparability but also credibility of appraisers nationwide.386
In addition, Dodd-Frank should contain a disclosure provision
regarding a lender’s failure to conform to the independence
appraisal standard. This provision would not preclude such lenders
from participating in the mortgage market. Rather, in those
instances, regulations should foster market stability by requiring
lenders who fail to conform to the independency standard to
highlight that fact in their disclosure to borrowers. 387 Presumably,
the disclosure requirement would steer responsible mortgage
borrowers away from lenders who fail to comply with the statutory
requirements.
For example, the disclosure should also contain a breakdown
of how the appraisal fee is distributed to the lender, appraiser, or
appraisal management companies.388 This requirement would
foster transparency in the mortgage approval process while keeping
borrowers informed. Ultimately, the mandatory licensing and

381. USPAP, supra note 28, at 1.
382. Id.
383. Green et al., supra note 25, at 9.
384. Russell, supra note 25, at 10.
385. Id. at 11.
386. Id.
387. Boyack, supra note 2, at 971.
388. See id. (discussing mandated appraisal fees disclosure).
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disclosure requirements across all states would eventually
eliminate the lack of licensing consistency and would overall
improve appraisal credibility.
4. Congress Should Impose Regulation on the Appraisal
Management Companies (“AMCs”)
Lastly, by amending provisions of Dodd-Frank, Congress
should establish clear guidelines and impose strict regulation of the
appraisal “middlemen” aka the Appraisal Management Companies
(“AMCs.”) 389 Although, Dodd-Frank heavily regulates individual
appraisers, it omits any regulation of the AMCs. 390 Lenders often
use AMCs to coordinate and handle the “logistics” of ordering and
scheduling the appraisal. AMCs often underpay appraisers because
appraisers who are willing to work with AMCs are often less
experienced and less likely to accurately determine the market
value.391 Consequently, AMCs are not subject to most of the
appraisal regulations, guidelines, and policies because they only
perform the administrative functions of the appraisal process. 392
Indeed, the AMCs are entirely unregulated at the federal level
and are subject to appraisal regulations in only a handful of
states.393 To seal the gap between lenders who choose to work with
AMCs, and AMCs themselves, the Dodd-Frank Act should require
lenders to maintain adequate resources to address and monitor
such third-party arrangements.394 If lenders are to remain in charge
of the lending and appraisal process, they need to have sufficient
qualify control systems in place. Spending more money and
resources on such systems will encourage them to look for quality
appraisals done by licensed professionals, rather than relying on
automatic collateral evaluations. But, this alone will not be enough.
To protect consumers and appraisers from fraud, Congress
should address the lack of federal regulation of the appraisal

389. See Russell, supra note 25, at 18 (explaining,
AMCs are third party arrangements, in which the lender engages a third
party [an appraisal management company] to perform real property
valuation-related services, such as selecting appraiser to perform an
appraisal. In these situations, it is the responsibility of the lender to
understand and manage the risks associated with that arrangement.
However, lenders are often not doing their diligence in overseeing AMCs.
Id.
390. Id. at 16.
391. Murray, supra note 3, at 1326.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Russell, supra note 25, at 18. The USPAP requires “that a third party
selects an appraiser or a person to perform an evaluation who is competent and
independent, has the requisite experience and training for the assignment, and
thorough knowledge of the subject property's market.” Id.

2019]

Automatic Collateral Evaluations

481

management companies immediately.395 To ensure consumer
protection, the amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act should clearly
establish AMCs rights and responsibilities, as well as statutory
liability for failing to comply with the statute. Without proper
federal regulation of appraisal management companies, the
integrity of the independency standard will remain compromised.

B. Congress Should Enact Regulation to Mandate The
Use Of The Independent Appraisal Assignment
System
While the independent standard requirement makes collateral
evaluations more reliable, this standard alone is not enough to
ensure that such valuations are sound. 396 Appraisers often violate
the Ethics Rule397 when they submit to pressures exerted by loan
origination parties in hopes of receiving their continued business.
So to preserve the integrity of the appraisal system, the opportunity
of self-interested loan origination parties must be eliminated. 398
Congress can achieve this by enacting a statute that requires
mortgage lenders and appraisers to utilize an independent and
neutral appraisal assignment system, which will substantially
reduce lenders’ propensity for choosing the same appraisal company
in every transaction.
The independent appraisal assignment system is not a new
concept.399 But the previous system in place, FHA Fee Panel
System, had major flaws.400 It allowed lenders to freely choose and
employ appraisers in their specific localities. 401 A closer look at the
FHA Fee Panel system revealed that lender-selected appraisers
were performing the vast majority of the appraisals.402 Ultimately,
the appraiser independent standard was compromised which led to
the termination of the FHA Fee Panel system. 403
Despite its imperfections, the concept of the independent
appraisal assignment system itself is not a bad idea. But it must be
redesigned to incorporate innovative technology with emphasis on
the neutrality function. The independent appraiser assignment
system should be similar to the “desktop” software utilized by
Freddie Mac, in that it should require all licensed appraisers to
395. Id.
396. Boyack, supra note 2, at 971.
397. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 1 (explaining that the Conduct section of
the Ethics Rule in USPAP requires an appraiser to be independent, impartial,
and objective, and to preform assignments without bias).
398. Boyack, supra note 2, at 971.
399. Murray, supra note 3, at 1319.
400. See id. at 1320 (emphasizing flaws in the FHA panel).
401. Id.
402. Boyack, supra note 2, at 1320.
403. Id.
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register with the system and provide proof of licensing. 404 When
scheduling appraisals, lenders should not be allowed to choose
freely, but rather, the system should randomly assign an appraiser
from the pool of available appraisers in that specific area. The
random assignment function would substantially reduce the
likelihood of loan origination parties to employ repeat appraisers.
Today, many appraisal-scheduling systems are already in
place,405 but most of them do not have a function that allows for
random assignment of appraisers. Lenders should utilize the
appraisal scheduling systems because they offer a great deal of
benefits,406 but the lack of “random assignment function” provides
an opportunity to incentivize repeat appraisers to deliver
predetermined property values.407 So, lenders are still able to
employ appraisers with whom they prefer to share business.
The “random assignment function” of an appraisal-scheduling
system would eliminate the opportunity of self-interested parties to
exert pressure on appraisers to deliver predetermined property
values. Accordingly, Congress should respond by enacting sufficient
appraisal regulations that will remove self-interested parties from
positions of influence over appraisers.408 It can do so, by requiring
mortgage lenders and appraisers to participate in a neutral and
independent appraisal assignment system with a function that
provides for a random assignment of appraisal requests.

C. Congress Should Clarify Appraisal Standards
To ensure the health of the mortgage industry it is essential for
Congress to pass new legislation clarifying the appraisal standards.
With the real estate market slowly recovering from the most recent
economic recession, the need for new legislation is urgent.409
Otherwise, consumers will once again become victims of careless
and deceptive mortgage lending practices. 410 Therefore, Congress
must respond quickly with the following: first, the new legislation
should prohibit the use of automated collateral evaluations in all
residential mortgage transactions; second, the de minis threshold
in all federally related transactions must be eliminated; and third,
Congress should adopt a statutory provision that imposes legal
404. See USPAP, supra note 28, at 1 (discussing Freddie Mac’s desktop
software appraisal system).
405. See id. (advertising www.AppraisalFlow.Com, as an appraiser
software that maintains appointments, work statutes, and contains all reports
in an online platform).
406. Id.
407. Murray, supra note 3, at 1303.
408. Id. at 1313.
409. Chris Arnold, How to See If Home Prices Are Rising or Failing Where
You Live, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 7, 2017), www.npr.org/2017/07/07/
535784510/how-to-see-if-home-prices-are-rising-or-falling-where-you-live.
410. See generally, Reiss on Federal Government, supra note 4, at 8.
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liability on any appraisal conduct that is not in compliance with
USPAP.
1. Eliminate the use of ACEs in All Mortgage Transactions
First, Congress should pass a bill to mandate incorporation of
the independent appraisal standard, which also eliminates the use
of automated collateral evaluations (“ACEs”) in all residential
mortgage transactions. The period leading up to the Great
Recession witnessed big financial conglomerates (e.g. Freddie Mac)
reduce their appraisal requirements over time, gradually
incorporating allowances for “drive-by” appraisals (such as BPOs)
and ACEs on a high percentage of mortgage loans.411 Opting for
lower loan costs and/or quicker turn around times with ACEs will
not yield consistency or reliability.412 Lenders already tested this
concept before the Great Recession. Cheaper is not always better.
The real estate market also shows a fifteen percent decline in
the appraiser credential requirements in the last six years.413 The
appraisal field itself suffers from poor age attrition because new
entrants are discouraged to enter the field either due to market
conditions, burdensome appraisal assignments, or fear or being
replaced by ACEs.414 This decline also increased lender’s usage of
ACEs because in some real estate markets (e.g. rural areas) it was
difficult for lenders to promptly find an appraiser.415 Because
appraisers are required to pass education requirements set by the
USPAP, the use of ACEs has the potential to wipe out the appraisal
profession altogether.
While it is true that strict underwriting procedures can be
burdensome on the home buying process, opting for automatic
desktop software (i.e. ACE products) that only consider limited
computer data will not produce a reliable estimate of value. 416 In
fact, it will compromise the mortgage lending process by producing
property estimates that are either too high or far below the fair
market value. The Appraisal Standards Board (“ASB”) does not
deem ACEs as USPAP-complainant417 because they compromise
integrity of the financial system. Accordingly, Congress should
prohibit their use in all residential mortgage transactions.
Granted, innovation in technology and mortgage lending
practices is inevitable and can reduce time and costs, but the use of

411. Accessory Dwelling Units May Have Higher Values when Using Income
Approach: The Appraisal Journal, supra note 49.
412. USPAP, supra note 28, at 10-13.
413. Accessory Dwelling Units May Have Higher Values when Using Income
Approach: The Appraisal Journal, supra note 49.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. USPAP, supra note 28, at 7.
417. Id. at 10.
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ACEs should be limited to non-mortgaged transactions.418 Also, to
reduce the harsh effect of market cyclicality, Congress should adopt
a law that mirrors appraisal standards established by the USPAP.
This step is essential to the health of the mortgage industry,
because it will not only encourage ethical performance among real
estate professionals but also equip appraisers with the necessary
training to yield consistent and credible opinions of value. Congress
should also mandate that all financial institutions involved in
residential mortgage lending strictly adhere to the USPAP
standards. Accordingly, Congress should statutorily eliminate the
use of ACEs in all residential mortgage transactions.
2. Eliminate the De Minimis Threshold
Second, Congress’ new bill should eliminate the de minimis
threshold419 for all federally related transactions to increase the
number of residential mortgage transactions that are subject to
appraisal requirements.420
The de minis exemption is very
troublesome. According to data taken from S&P Case-Schiller 20City Home Price Index for the years 2009-2015, indicate that the
average price for homes in surveyed markets range from $140,000
to $175,000.421
The above data shows that most residential real estate
transactions fall below $250,000, and do not have the Dodd-Frank
protections, thereby nullifying the federal requirement for a
traditional appraisal.422 Many consumers are denied the right to a
professional appraisal in a significant number of mortgage
transactions.423 Such practice carries substantial risks not only for
consumers but also for the mortgage industry. Without a credible
appraisal, lender’s calculation of default risks will be grossly
impaired with negative impact on home equity values.
Homeowners, who rely on their home equity for “cushion,” are at an
increased risk of default if their equity is grossly disproportionate
418. See id. (clarifying that some examples can include an additional
diligence on appraisals to monitor fraud, quality control, to act as an appraisal
supplement, to monitor market changes in specific communities, and for other
internal non-lending purposes such as valuation of portfolio).
419. Russell, supra note 25, at 12.
A report issued in 2012 by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
to Congress stated that “Under authority granted by Title XI, the federal
regulators also have adopted regulations that exempt federally related
transactions of $250,000 or less from appraisal requirements” [meaning
that the services of a licensed or certified appraiser are not required].
Fannie and Freddie were also deemed exempt.
Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
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to its value. Consumers already face significant financial risks424
when they take out high interest loans, so it is essential that they
receive more protections from our government.
Accordingly, Congress should eliminate the de minis threshold.
All federally related residential mortgage transactions must be
subject to a traditional real estate appraisal. This will ensure that
consumers not only have access to credible property valuations, but
it will also protect them from deceptive loan underwriting
practices.425 In the event that Congress is unwilling to eliminate the
de minis threshold, it should nonetheless reduce it to $50,000, as
proposed back in 1991.426 This will ensure that most residential
transactions will have the appraisal protections since banks rarely
make mortgage loans for less than $50,000.
3. Congress Should Create Statutory Liability for Appraiser
Misconduct
To compensate for the difficulty in obtaining legal recourse,
Congress should create statutory liability for appraiser misconduct.
The statutory liability should not only extend to appraisers but also
to mortgage origination parties (i.e. mortgage brokers and lenders).
Elements required to prove under tort law (e.g. fraud or
misrepresentation) are extremely burdensome. These causes of
actions are very difficult to prove, and parties who rely on
fraudulent appraisals and are later injured as a result are often left
without legal recourse. But, some courts have already recognized
the negligent misrepresentation cause of action concerning real
estate appraisals.427 However, these cases are very rare and costly
to litigate.
Accountability for poorly conceived mortgage loans should
track irresponsible risk-taking behavior by various financial
institutions.428 At times, lenders may be the main perpetrators of
carless lending.429 But they often become victims of fraudulent
misrepresentations of borrower credentials by anxious mortgage
brokers waiting to collect their commission check. 430 Statutory
liability is necessary to constrain mortgage broker’s economic
424. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 30 (noting that
these high-interest loans are usually secured by a first lien on their primary
residence).
425. Russell, supra note 25, at 12.
426. See Accessory Dwelling Units May Have Higher Values when Using
Income Approach: The Appraisal Journal, supra note 49 (proposing that
Congress, should ultimately adopt the de minis rule proposed back in 1991, to
have the de minis threshold set at $50,000).
427. See F.D.I.C v. Masarsky, 968 F.Supp. 2d 915, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
(recognizing negligent misrepresentation of an appraisal).
428. Boyack, supra note 2, at 986.
429. Id.
430. Id.
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interests in making bigger and higher-interest-rate loans that yield
bigger origination fees and premiums paid by the lender. 431
Although the Dodd-Frank Act has curtailed some of the
monetary incentives paid to mortgage brokers from origination fees,
many borrowers are still victims of steering toward higher-priced
mortgages. It is important to note that mortgage brokers are not
traditionally viewed as borrowers’ agents, nor do lenders typically
owe borrowers any fiduciary duties.432 “But borrowers significantly
interact with and rely upon mortgage brokers, suggesting that
courts or legislature should protect borrower expectation by finding
that certain legal duties exist.”433
Until Congress clearly defines what duties lenders and
mortgage brokers owe to borrowers, mortgage brokers should be
required to disclose that they are agents of borrowers in every
mortgage transaction. This disclosure requirement should be a
condition to clear the loan from underwriting prior to closing.
Because borrowers closely interact with mortgage brokers who
process their loans, Congress should clearly define what duties they
owe to borrowers in mortgage transactions. 434
Ultimately, Congress’ establishment of clear statutory liability
for engaging in deceptive lending practices, steering, and appraisals
that violate the USPAP standards, will protect borrowers against
loan origination parties who make poorly conceived loans. Statutory
liability will also provide the necessary legal recourse for parties
who were injured by relying on fraudulent appraisals. Because
Congress has the power to preempt state lending regulations
because of our dual banking system, 435 it is imperative for Congress
to set clear statutory liability for appraisal misconduct.

D. Congress Should Repeal the Crapo Bill As It
Provides an Easy Pathway To Dangerous Mortgage
Lending Practices.
The Economic Growth, Regulatory, Relief, and Consumer
Protection Act (“The Crapo Bill”) is a dangerous piece of legislation
that ignores the causes of the most recent financial crisis. 436 By
loosening up financial regulations, Congress is taking a major step
backwards on consumer protection. The bill runs contrary to the
goal of Dodd-Frank (i.e. consumer protection) and it may have
431. Id.
432. Id. at 987.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. See Reiss on Federal Government, supra note 4, at 32 (discussing
Congress’ preemptive powers, and the dual banking system in which both states
and the federal government charter and regulate banks and other savings
institutions).
436. Gelzinis & Valenti, supra note 223, at 1.
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devastating impacts on the financial sector if there is another loan
crisis.437
This bill goes far beyond the health of community banks and
credit unions. It removes protections for twenty-five of the top
thirty-eight banks; weakens regulations on the biggest players and
encourages them to manipulate regulations for their benefit; and
saps consumer protections.438 Crapo’s consequences can be severe,
with regulators being less prepared to deal with the next financial
crisis.439 Although Crapo aims to improve consumer access to
mortgage credit, it encourages banks to undercut their
underwriting procedures.440
Today, certain qualifying borrowers once again have the option
to purchase a home with a low down-payment or no down-payment
at all.441 In addition, rolling back certain appraisal requirements for
higher-risk mortgages in rural areas also impose serious risks that
threaten consumer protection and the appraisal industry. Crapo
also provides a dangerous path for banks to bypass their
underwriting procedures; something that Congress was very
concerned about when it passed the Dodd-Frank Act.442
Since Crapo was signed into early this year, one of the biggest
questions is the way in which the federal government will choose to
implement the bill. As it currently stands, Crapo repeals too many
of the essential protections afforded by the Dodd-Frank Act. In the
light of the most recent financial crisis and its devastating effect on
the economy, Congress should repeal this bill. In the alternative,
Congress should remove the rural appraisal exemption and keep
the essential consumer protections afforded by the Dodd-Frank Act.

V.

CONCLUSION

It is undisputed that both approaches, the traditional appraisal
approach and the alternate valuation products, carry substantial
imperfections and risks associated with using both. But proper
legislation can encourage appraisers to engage in ethical
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regulations in Dodd-Frank to handle the failure of financial firms and that its
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performance that will yield consistent and reliable results. Perhaps
it should be noted that the traditional real estate appraisal remains
as the only independent source in a home mortgage transaction.
When done in compliance with USPAP standards, it serves as an
additional layer of consumer protection against big banks’ deceptive
underwriting procedures. As we have seen, those protections are
essential to the health of our economy.
By allowing financial institutions, such as Freddie Mac, retain
significant control over the appraisal process, the mortgage
industry will be once again compromised. The use of ACEs has
proved defective and should not be utilized in any mortgage
transaction that requires a property value as collateral for the loan.
Accordingly, Congress should respond to this problem with a
statutory elimination of the use of ACEs in such transactions. This
will not only eliminate the risk of fraudulent underwriting
standards but will also set clear appraisal guidelines to encourage
consistently and reliability in the appraisal process. Congress
should do so by either extending the provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act or by passing completely new legislation pertaining to
residential real estate appraisals consistent with suggestions in this
Comment.

